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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT
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ALBANIAN REFUGEES IN YUGOSLAVIA DISCUSS LIFE IN HOMELAND

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 28 Apr 83 p 6

[Article by B. Begoli]

[Text] Moving stories of four Albanians who fled to Yugoslavia because of terror and impossible living conditions in this neighboring country, where the people languish under the yoke of Enver Hoxha's dictatorship.

TV Pristina last Friday broadcast a documentary produced by Television Skopje which ran 45 minutes under the title of "Albania--Enver Hoxha's Hell." Four emigrants from Albania and their moving testimony about current difficult conditions inside this country were presented. We will provide segments from their stories about which today's issue of Pristina's "Rilindja" writes.

Selim Zeciri: driver--mechanic born 1948, in Tirana

...Albania is a country isolated from the entire world. It is isolated in the true sense of the word. A conscious policy is followed there by which the real truth is hidden from the people. This is done by preventing the reception of radio and television programs from neighboring countries. On the other hand, they enrich their own programming with various TV programs in which they attempt to acquaint the Albanian people with some backward tribes from India or Africa or they present only underdeveloped countries and their realities. Nothing is ever said here about developed countries.

Konstantin Tolumi: peasant from Seson near Elbasan.

...Peasants have to work up to 15 hours daily. The bell is rung at 5:00 AM, we take a crust of bread and are off to the fields. Everyone has to cultivate 2 and a half dunums of planted corn or 1,500 square meters of wheat a day. This norm can be met and brings the peasant, on the average, 60 to 70 leka. I have to work 10 days in order to earn enough for a regular shirt. One must work 15 days for a pair of shoes.

If you miss work one day, that means you are in real trouble. Immediately they begin an investigation into why you did not go to work and because of

that they throw you in jail. You can imagine how one farm family lives with such pay. My house has no ceiling, I have no table or chairs not to speak of a radio or other things. For 8 to 10 months of a year we eat corn bread, the other 3 months, wheat bread. If you do not work, you receive no bread, and peasants who refuse corn bread usually end up in jail.

The village has fallen into complete disrepair. The peasant has no free time, not even on Sunday or for a holiday. Work details are organized every Sunday either in agriculture or to maintain the numerous bunkers. The peasant cannot rest even when he is getting married. The young people get one day off and the next day, they are right back to work. As far as weddings are concerned, they are poor. Besides that, they cannot even be fun because the state will immediately jump on your back with questions about where the money and other things came from.

Abdullah Kadriu: born in Peskopija, driver-mechanic:

...It is somewhat better for the worker than for the peasant. As a driver-mechanic, I earn from 5 to 6,000 leka. In order to buy a shirt, a worker must work 10 days, a peasant, a full 2 months.

The intelligensia is the class which manages the people. It, without doubt, lives better, earns more and the state treats it much better. It is a weapon of the state and it runs politics. It has grand pretensions. While a peasant must worry day and night to earn enough for a piece of bread, the intelligensia wants automobiles, but it does not dare admit that publicly.

Musa Bardhi: unemployed from Tirana:

...I would say something about those from Kosovo who live in Albania. They are treated as if they are not Albanians. Their living conditions are poor, jobs are hard to come by and there are many difficulties with schooling. They receive no stipends. Recently, after the demonstrations in Kosova, they have received somewhat better treatment.

As far as the demonstrations are concerned, I think they had to be organized in Albania by those from Kosovo because they do not enjoy full freedom there. They have full rights in Kosovo. They have total freedom in the true sense of the word.

They have wealth, land, livestock, private shops and can freely go and work wherever they want. Everyone has a passport. Emigrants in Albania, be they from Kosovo, Greece, Macedonia or Montenegro, have no rights whatsoever. The word freedom exists only as a word. All are mistreated by the Sigurimija and are interned in camps or villages.

Selim Zeciri:--Since I did not have even the basics for life (without a house), I was forced to flee and leave a son and mother. It is difficult for me because they will feel the repercussions. I believe, however, that I will find other mothers, fathers and children to whom I will tell about the difficult conditions in Albania today.

BULGARIA

RESPONSIBILITIES, QUALITIES REQUIRED FROM YOUNG ARMY OFFICERS

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 17 May 83 pp 1-2

[Article by Col Gen Mircho Asenov, deputy minister of national defense:
"Responsibility of Young Officers for Steady Improvement of Combat Training"]

[Text] In its 3 February 1983 issue NARODNA ARMIYA published the editorial article "Along the Great Path of Duty." A number of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol activists responded to the editors' invitation to participate in the discussion of the questions raised in the article on the development of the young officers, and to share their views and experience. Reaction to the article was extensive and more than 50 letters were published. This article concludes the readers' discussion, and the editors wish to thank all participants.

The number and content of the letters to the editors, which were printed in the section "Where, When and How Do the Young Officers Develop," convincingly prove that the question raised in the editorial article excited many readers. The discussion turned into a frank conversation on the vocation and duty of the officer and his responsibility to the people and the homeland. The participants included members of all generations of commanders and political workers, who shared views and experience in the growth and development of the young officers and their role, tasks and responsibilities in enhancing the quality of combat and political training, the education of the personnel, the further strengthening of discipline and the further enhancement of the combat capability and readiness of the troops.

Let me emphasize that most of the officers are BCP members. They are highly skilled and excellently trained specialists.

The contemporary revolution in military affairs, the saturation of the armed forces with modern combat equipment and armaments, new troop control methods, the stricter requirements regarding the intensification of the training process and the complex international situation have made substantial changes in the training and activities of military cadres. Today's officer corps must possess specific knowledge of military affairs, a broad general education and culture and a wide political and military and technical outlook.

The reinforcement of the Bulgarian People's Army with young officers calls for their profound study of military affairs in the military academies and army

revolutionary traditions and, leaning on the rich experience of the older generation, multiply the heroic deeds of their fathers and grandfathers.

The worsened international situation makes it incumbent upon commanders and political organs steadily to upgrade the combat readiness of the army for active combat operations.

High combat readiness is the result of the joint efforts of commanders and political workers of all ranks and privates, sergeants, master sergeants and party and Komsomol organizations. The young officers -- the largest body of command personnel -- have a special place and role in strengthening it.

High combat and political readiness are some of the basic components in maintaining steady and high-level combat readiness. The young officers are the main organizers and managers of combat training. It is under their guidance that the troops learn what they must know in case of war. The nature of modern combined forces combat, combat equipment, weaponry and the ability to direct subunits in combat are learned by the personnel in the course of their daily training.

The ability of small detachments to defeat the enemy is determined above all by their training in marksmanship and their skill in quickly using their weapons in combat in order to hit the targets with the lowest possible expenditure of ammunition. This skill, however, is gained as a result of classroom work, training and target practice under high stress and without simplifications and conventions.

The prompt bringing up of troops to a state of full combat readiness would be meaningless unless they are trained to engage in active headlong combat operations and skillfully aim at the fastest possible routing of the enemy.

What are the characteristic features in the activities of the young officer? They include above all his Marxist-Leninist outlook, comprehensive military knowledge, profound military and specialized training and modern practical skills in controlling the combat operations of his subunit. He must also be brave, firm, initiative-minded and resourceful. He must be strong willed, disciplined and exacting and set a personal example in all things.

The young people who wear the insignia cannot fully prove their worth without high professional training. "The overall and full realization of oneself," Comrade Todor Zhivkov says, "is the new and largely essential approach to the young generation."

Naturally, such ideological and professional qualities are developed in the officer through his entire military career -- from his first day in the military academy to the day of his retirement. This is a steady process, as the discussion sponsored by the newspaper confirmed. It was justifiably emphasized that the successful resolution of the problems set the Bulgarian People's Army by the party and the steady development of military affairs persistently call for upgrading the political consciousness, responsibility and activeness of every young officer.

However, as some writers justifiably note, the present meaning of the concept of "learning military affairs" has broadened considerably and acquired a richer meaning. The officer cannot grow and develop without knowledge of major achievements in the social and military sciences, technology, culture and arts, the principles governing the building of the Bulgarian People's Army and the foundations of party-political work. He must steadily enrich his knowledge and be able to absorb any new development in the training and education of his subordinates. An officer who falls behind or has been trained one-sidedly cannot cope with such tasks.

This was the tenor of many letters, including those of officers Toshkov, Neshev, Spasov, Stefanov and many others.

Nevertheless, if we search for the full and precise answer to the question of "where, when and how do young officers develop," we would see that virtually all the published letters or views name the regular and high-quality training process, organized fully in accordance with modern requirements governing troop training. This is perfectly accurate, for the training process today is the equivalent of the battle field where the question of high combat readiness is resolved. The letters of officers Zinoviev, Kabranski, Vasilev, Loginov, Todorov, Genov, Radoev and many others justifiably stress that in the course of the daily training process the troops acquire profound knowledge and lasting convictions, qualities and skills, and improve their ability to handle weapons and combat equipment under the complex circumstances of nuclear war. More than ever before education, training, strengthening the discipline and improving the moral-political and mental training of the troops are closely interrelated, forming a single entity. Priority is given to the task of model combat guard duty, reducing the time for bringing the troops up to a state of combat readiness and the skillful and continual management of the subunits.

The army has provided all necessary conditions for the successful solution of these problems. Naturally, the young officers entering the forces from the military academies with relatively high military theoretical, technological and methodical training and a strong Marxist-Leninist outlook are a reliable factor in this work.

What characterizes the work of most young officers?

Their distinguishing features are their love for their officer's profession, their dedicated efforts to train and educate their subordinates and their aspiration toward steadily upgrading their methodical skills and applying new education and training methods. In the course of their daily practice they dedicate a great deal of work to their own training.

Naturally, their achievements are below the strict party requirements. As some of the readers pointed out, life and the service face the officer's pedagogical and methodical training with particularly strict requirements. A future war, should the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, would put all aspects of the human character, moral and physical forces most of all, to a stern test. Under the difficult circumstances of a nuclear missile war it is the troops and commanders who carry deep within their hearts the ideas of communism and faith in the victory of our cause, who are highly trained

theoretically and have a creative approach to the work, who are active, initiative-minded and disciplined and who display courage, daring and dedication, a strong character, firm will power and a high combat spirit who will endure. It is particularly important for the young officers to possess high moral and combat qualities and to develop the same qualities in their subordinates in the course of the training process.

The process of shaping such qualities begins in the military schools. However, it is extended in the course of their practical activities as unit commanders. The character and high moral-combat qualities of the young officer take shape in the course of the struggle for surmounting difficulties, resolving minor and major training problems, persistent work in the training and education of the troops, steady improvement of their military and political knowledge and strict exigency toward themselves and their subordinates.

The young officer must develop as a commander who can withstand the various combat training factors, who is able to make quick and motivated decisions and daringly lead his subordinates in combat. He must display initiative, a feeling of high personal responsibility and readiness to assume sensible risks. Officer Professor Spasov accurately formulates the question of daring and risk in training. He writes that "Questions of daring and risk can find their place both in the organization and course of the training process."

Officers must train their subordinates to do what must be done in war. The meaningful and varied training process, tactical exercises and fire practice, together with the purposeful use of the elements of mental training, are the tried means in resolving this problem. The atmosphere in each exercise must be such as to help the troops to acquire the type of knowledge, skills and habits they will need in order to win the battle. Many of the letters approve of young officers who try to temper the will power and the physical and mental endurance of the troops and to train them in peace time for the heavy trials of modern warfare in the course of practice fire exercises, high sea navigation, and air and tank training.

A number of responses confirm that now the important task of the young officer is to achieve excellent mastery and model maintenance of equipment and armaments. Today the army numbers a large unit of skilled young cadres. Virtually all officers who graduate from military academies have higher military engineering training. However, military technology and armaments develop and improve continually, for which reason we must steadily upgrade our technical training and develop the movement for more graded specialists and masters of their profession. As officer Vasilev stressed in his letter, the young officers are called upon to lead, to be the spreaders of high technical standards among the personnel. Many other readers concentrate on the question of the further development of creative youth initiatives, which must be aimed at advancing and modernizing the training-material facilities, making personnel training more efficient, developing new prototypes and improving the combat indicators and tactical and technical qualities of available weapons and combat materiel.

The senior commanders, who have great practical and organizational experience, are an important factor in the development of the young officers. Through

their knowledge and personal example they must show, direct, teach and share their experience with the young.

The authors of many letters closely relate the development of the young officers with their discipline and personal example, for the authority of the young officer is based above all on his qualities as a leader and behavior toward his subordinates. Through his discipline and organization in his work and self-exigency, the commander not only influences his subordinates but gains the moral right to demand of them to observe the military statutes. Many writers cite convincing examples proving that such commanders are loved and respected even by those toward whom they have shown just commander strictness.

The role of the young officer in strengthening discipline is based above all on the fact that he stands closest to the privates and the sergeants, personally organizes and supervises the observance of the statutes, and personally provides combat and political training. The able combination of such qualities is the base for discipline successes achieved by many young officers.

Unfortunately, some authors also sadly write about young officers who fail to set models of discipline. In discussing this problem, officer Stefanov writes that "The battle for the men goes on every day. Naturally, it involves both victories and defeats. During the battle the faint-hearted, the people of unformed character are subject to severe trials. Thus, Lt Komshev, deputy company commander for political affairs, believes that chumminess is his strongest weapon. In practice, however, this weapon has been turned against him. This young officer has lost some of his authority and discipline."

The young officer must not tolerate liberalism. Wherever necessary, he must develop strong military discipline. Many readers point out that in the course of their development the young officers must learn more from the experience of their best comrades and senior commanders, show greater tactfulness and skill in relations with subordinates and make active political efforts in order to strengthen the discipline and the political and moral state in their subunits. It is very important for them to be able to make proper use of the power of public opinion in developing the discipline among their subordinates. This presumes the creation of strong military collectives and the ability on the part of the young officers to rely on the party and Komsomol organizations and to work with the party groups and Komsomol committees and societies.

The young officer can find an inexhaustible source of wisdom, inspiration and work energy in the ideological wealth of Marxism-Leninism and the party's decisions. Many of the readers indicate in their letters that the profound application of these principles provides them with a key to the most accurate understanding of processes in all areas of social life, the class struggle, international events, and the development of military affairs. This helps them to develop within themselves a Leninist work style and arms them with a dialectical method and a class-party approach in solving specific practical problems in the training and education of their subordinates.

Some participants in the discussion tend to emphasize quite heavily the role of some factors which affect the molding of young officers. Thus, for

example, some accuse the military academies for the fact that the officers lack solid training in military theory, command-organizing qualities, method skills and moral perfection. Other viewpoints reveal an excessive demand concerning the pace of command development, idealization of personal experience or feeling of dissatisfaction with isolated shortcomings in army life in some units.

The young officers must be viewed not as fully developed commanders but as commanders who are as yet to develop and grow. In this respect they need systematic and specific aid by strengthening their faith in themselves. We must trust them while supervising them and displaying comradely concern by assigning them systematically tasks consistent with their forces and experience. Any neglect of this approach adversely affects the mentality and the work of the young officers, hinders their self-initiative and could lead to the waste of development opportunities.

The personal example of behavior and the attitude displayed by senior commanders and political workers among the young officers are of great importance in terms of their further development. There is no justification for the action of Sr Lt Tsvetkov who violated regulations in carrying out a flight assignment with his student.

Unquestionably, the thus formulated and discussed problems of the development of commanders in the course of the discussion on "Where, When and How Do the Young Officers Develop," carried out in NARODNA ARMIYA, reached and affected the officer corps. Displaying feelings of responsibility and patriotism, the participants shared their service and party experience and observations based on the daily training process and their concern for the further training and education of young officer cadres.

The suggestions and recommendations they formulated deal with important aspects of life in military academies and among the troops and indicate our common concern for the development and improvement of the all-round training of the officer and his growth as a modern manager with the qualities indicated by Comrade Todor Zhivkov: "High communist idea- and principle-mindedness in resolving small and large problems, model implementation of assignments, moral purity, modesty, high culture and knowledge, initiative-mindedness, feeling of responsibility and dedicated service to the people."

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MILITIA LAXITY TOWARD SPECULATORS, CORRUPTION CRITICIZED

Unearned Income Crackdown Urged

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 11 May 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Lt Col Yordan Tankov, deputy chief of Economic Administration, People's Militia Directorate: "Let Us Put a Barrier in the Way of Unearned Income"]

[Text] Requirements of Law on Citizens' Property and Tasks of MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Agencies

Problems of Seminar-Conferences on Basic Thrusts of NM [People's Militia] Activity in the Spirit of Comrade Todor Zhivkov's New Theoretical Elaborations and Practical Approaches since the 12th BCP Congress

On 28 March 1983 a national conference on the enforcement of chapter III of the ZSG [Law on Citizens' Property] was held at which the work of all state specialized agencies for its implementation over a 10-year period was discussed. The report given at the conference emphasized that the 12th BCP Congress had assigned the task of creating an atmosphere of implacability towards infractions of the rule of law and discipline. In a number of his speeches since the congress Comrade T. Zhivkov has repeatedly called with exceptional force for the waging of a resolute campaign against the parasitic consumption and negative phenomena that sap the pillars of our socialist way of life, of our communist morality.

We have had a fairly long period of working to turn the cutting edge of the law against the attempts of individual citizens to live off unearned income. Considerable practical experience has been built up. A number of substantial deficiencies are still in evidence, however, in the campaign of state and public agencies and organizations. Nor have the capabilities of MVR agencies been fully utilized although recently they have stepped up their work. They are charged with investigating, analyzing, and taking measures for, the observance of the laws by all organizations and citizens. From this viewpoint, serious demands could be made on the MVR agencies in a number of okrugs and complaints of inaction brought against them.

Analysis of the data on the campaign of the MVR agencies against the unearned income of citizens during the 1979-1982 period shows an unfavorable trend. Whereas in 1980 they worked on 440 dossiers and found 2.4 million leva of unearned income, in 1982 the number of dossiers fell to 298, and the unearned income found amounted to only half a million leva. Considering that half of the results achieved last year was the doing of the Varna MVR agencies, it becomes clear that most of the other units did not do good work and that there was a considerable retreat from what was gained in past years. The Sofia City Administration in 1980 worked on 82 dossiers totaling 456,772 leva, and in 1981 on 34 dossiers totaling 653,500 leva, but in 1982 on only 13 dossiers totaling 33,725 leva. There was a worsening of results in Plovdiv, Sliven, Sofia Okrug, Mikhaylovgrad, St. Zagora, V. Turnovo, Vidin, Vratsa etc.

Work was slow on the dossiers that they compiled as well as on those sent them for checking by the Article 38 ZSG commissions. Last year in Sofia Okrug there were 22 old dossiers and five new ones were compiled, that is to say, 27 were worked on, of which only three were closed. In some units no work at all was done on this question for a long time. During the period from 1979 to 1982 no work on unearned income was done and reported in Blagoevgrad. In Kurdzhali no work was reported during the whole of 1982, and according to the data of the okrug Article 38 ZSG commission it can be seen that our agencies filed only two tipoffs. Although there were some achievements, the work was unsatisfactory in Burgas, Gabrovo, Turgovishte, Tolbukhin, Khaskovo etc.

The inexplicable differences between the reports through out channels and those of the okrug Article 38 ZSG commissions are also a sign of the lack of thoroughness of the work in this area. From the reports of the MVR okrug administrations for 1982, it can be seen that they closed 199 dossiers, while the data of the okrug Article 38 ZSG commissions indicate that there were only 112 of these dossiers. Veliko Turnovo, Vidin, Vratsa etc. in their reports show some, but the figures for completed work are small, while from the data of the okrug commissions it is obvious that there was no activity. Other MVR okrug administrations such as Gabrovo, Sofia, Stara Zagora, Tolbukhin, Khaskovo etc. report considerably more than show up for them on the okrug commission's report, while the okrug commissions report more work for Lovech, Smolyan etc. than the latter themselves indicated in their report.

The obligations to collect information on persons who have unearned income and to check and work on dossiers sent by the okrug Article 38 ZSG commissions are not an obligation solely of the NM economic services. In this regard rayon inspectors, investigators and other MVR functionaries must exhibit greater activity. During the 1979-1982 period the NM economic services worked on 651 dossiers and found unearned income totaling over 5 million leva. NM protective personnel worked on 78 dossiers totaling 228,408 leva. Investigators worked on only 10 dossiers totaling 60,180 leva. It should be noted that the results of the protective services were best in 1981: 59 dossiers totaling 157,266 leva. The activity of the economic services in 1982 were utterly unsatisfactory. Whereas in past years they worked on dossiers totaling from 1.5 to 2 million leva of unearned income, in 1982 the results were two or three times poorer.

Rayon inspectors and operatives from the criminal and economic services monitor persons not engaged in socially useful labor and keep watch on their private economic activity in urban districts and in towns and villages, as well as on peddlers, persons with a private trade etc. Yet these persons pile up much unearned income. Rayon inspectors have the opportunity, with the assistance of the public, to get more tipoffs and, jointly with the economic services, to clarify and document them.

In looking into economic and other crimes, investigators often get information about unearned income. They have the opportunity to give tipoffs too, to compile dossiers and work more actively on this question. They can, to a greater extent, give legal and methods assistance to rayon inspectors and operatives in their work on the dossiers of okrug Article 38 ZSG commissions and in clarifying the tipoffs they get etc. This is necessary since errors, infractions of the law and difficulties occur in collecting evidence, there are gaps in the data etc. More active use must be made of nontable-of-organization employees of the MVR economic, protective and investigative services. The example of the Varna MVR okrug administration is especially instructive in this regard.

MVR agencies must set value on their activity against unearned income, on unity of action among the economic, protective, investigative and other services in this area, and on teamwork with okrug Article 38 ZSG commissions. All MVR services and functionaries must step up the collection of information about the receipt of unearned income, must work actively and thoroughly on the dossiers and tipoffs that the okrug commissions give them to check out, and must concentrate their main forces on the most serious cases of the receipt of unearned income in comparatively large amounts. Service and party leaders of MVR units must be taken strictly to task for a passive attitude towards this question.

Profiteering Case History Examined

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 11 May 83 p 3

[Article by Asen Akimov: "Breakthrough"]

[Text] The first tipoffs coming to the Economic Detachment at the Sofia City MVR Administration were significant: a citizen of the capital, Nikola Boyanov, has a great deal of money. In just one evening he paid over 800 leva for a "feast" with friends. Then he threw away 15,000 gambling. He is living in luxury and keeping several girl friends. Only somebody with a very large unearned income can live like this. But what does he do? And where does he get so much money? . . . Operative Lt Col Todor Stoyanov was charged with clarifying these questions. He had been active for over 20 years in the sphere of noneconomic suspects and was well acquainted with their paper flow, but . . .

Despite his rich experience he had not had an encounter with people in this "line." It turned out that he had run into an "artist-decorator," as Boyanov, who had two "studios," styled himself. In fact, these proved to be small workshops in each of which he had hired several persons to work for him. For

nearly a year Stoyanov kept dropping around and observing, investigating and analyzing, comparing and pondering. He had dozens of cases and much bigger ones at that, but here he had happened into a totally new sphere where MVR agencies had not yet penetrated. There was no doubt that he was dealing with profiteers who had not yet experienced the severity of the law, but where should he begin and what, to be more precise, should he look for? What were the mechanics of their crime that yielded them a huge unearned income. . . ?

The first thing Communist Todor Stoyanov undertook was to ascertain the method of production. He undertook to clarify the nature of the output: Were the products which the two "workshops" spewed forth day and night artistic? Where, how and at what price was this "merchandise," consisting of pictures, teaching aids and devices, mottoes and placards, portraits and road signs, distributed . . . ?

The method of production turned out to be quite simple--so-called screen printing, with thousands of copies made from a single one! Pure handicraft work, the output of which was of dubious artistic value. The national art commission confirmed this. "Pseudo art products," its members declared with indignation. "Examples of tastelessness which, in a word, we would call kitsch! According to schedule 557, they should be sold as handicraft products. . ." But how did our "heroes" proceed?

After hiring dozens of marketing agents, headed up by Vasil Urumov, who divided up the country into regions among themselves, Nikola Boyanov distributed his products as works of art at prices 10 times higher than their worth (!?), as determined in No. 32/1971 of DURZHAVEN VESTNIK [Official Gazette]. For the purpose documents with false information were compiled, enabling them to obtain without authority public property worth tens and hundreds of thousands of leva. But where were the materials--the polystyrene sheets--got? Who bought these pseudoart products? Was there nobody to monitor the activity of these "kitsch merchants" swarming over the country?

The more he went into the heart of the case, the more the questions increased, and the more the volume of investigative work grew. Although in some responsible public circles doubts arose whether there was anything criminal in the activity of the group of pseudoartists, the investigations continued with new force. The plastic (polystyrene sheets), it turned out, was bought regularly from certain state enterprises like the People's Republic DIP [State Industrial Enterprise] at Ilentsi; the self-styled creative artists took substandards. They produced and sold, but exclusively to state departments--schools, enterprises and institutions. And the only way to have dealings with them was on a legal basis, with the approbation of the people's councils. They got model "Ch" [expansion unknown; possibly chastnostopanski, private economic] advice notes and invoices, too. This, in fact, is authorization for private handicraft work. Appended to the document with false information, it actually enabled them to obtain public property of great value, without authorization.

Covert as the activity of the group of pseudoartists might be, for 5 or 6 years they held sway throughout the country, accumulated many tens and hundreds of thousands of unearned income, and the clue to their crime rapidly unfolded.

Nikola Boyanov died, but his business continued to "live" in its first successive buyer and marketing agent of the "merchandise," criminal offender Vasil Urumov, convicted 14 times of illegal acts. Strange as it may seem, it turned out that several score people were employed to help him. And "enthusiasts" like Kiril Mikhaylov in their turn opened "studios," hired workers and established their respective network. He even produced a cliché press, by means of which he made his own invoice books. Thus the amount of his actual income could not be seen, and the rayon people's council could not tax him by taxing it. More than that--he began to sell books of invoices to his colleagues--at 500 leva a piece!

The persistence of the operational service continued with growing intensity. Soon it came upon something utterly unbelievable: the pseudoartists' unique thievery from state enterprises and institutions was made possible and covered up by some officials in the rayon people's councils--the very ones who were supposed to keep an eye on and monitor the activity of private craftsmen and dealers so as to tax them. At first glance, though, everything here was in order, too--books of invoices were given to the "artist-decorators," by means of which they began to sell their "merchandise." We say "at first glance," for subsequent more serious auditing proved that there was no strict accounting in this regard. Moreover, sunk in the mire of corruption, some tax inspectors like Stoyanka Georgieva and Pavlina Mineva of the Blagoevski Rayon People's Council in the capital began themselves to pare down the pseudoartists' income. In their fallen state they went so far as to steal 5 books of invoices and gave them to Boyanov and Urumov. For all this, to be sure, they received appropriate "remuneration" in hundreds and thousands of leva, for which there is but one name--bribery! Corresponding bribes in the form of commissions were received by other officials like the chief accountant of the automobile combine in Plovdiv, Vasil Milushev. . .

A breakthrough into a new and unfamiliar sector, into the sphere of noneconomic suspects has been made. On 23 March 1983 criminal case No. 1576/81 of the Sofia City Court was closed. Vasil Urumov was sentenced to deprivation of liberty for 14 years, Kiril Mikhaylov for 3 years and 6 months, Stoyanka Georgieva for 3 years, Pavlinka Mineva for 1 year and 10 months, Vasil Milushev for 1 year.

Lt Col Todor Stoyanov has reason to be satisfied with the breakthrough that he made. Drawing on his experience, other proceedings have been instituted in Sofia and Plovdiv, in Stara Zagora and Khaskovo. . . He wears the badge of "Outstanding MVR Man" with ever greater pride.

6474

CSO: 2200/90

BULGARIA

DOCUMENTARY MOVIE ON 'SHIELD 82' MILITARY EXERCISES

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 14 May 83 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Andreev: "Battle Friendship on the Screen; Full-Length Documentary on 'Shield 82'"]

[Text] The cooperation between the People's Army Films Studio and the Boyana Feature Films Studio is becoming increasingly closer. After "Khan Asparukh" and "The Shock," once again the two studios are presenting a joint production: A full-length color documentary on the "Shield 82" Exercise of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. The film "Guarding the Peace" (script by Col Georgi Zlatinov, directed by Brayko Popov, chief consultant Maj Gen Ivan Shtiliyanov, editor Lyudmil Cholakov, author Ivan Ladachki, chief cameraman Dimitur Bebenov) is a vivid movie in the battle genre, of emphatic political and international import. Through images and words, for 1 hour, more than the impressive dynamics of the latest joint exercise conducted by the fraternal armies comes to life on the screen. High combat skill, invincible power and the triumph of combat friendship in the name of the defense of the socialist comity and the preservation of peace are the truths about the exercise and the encounters shown in the film.

The movie preview was held yesterday at Movie House, followed by a meeting between the creative collective and representatives of the military and civilian press. A number of questions were asked on the creation of the documentary, and impressions on its qualities were exchanged. An interesting documentary has been created, People's Actor Lyudmil Staykov, secretary of the Union of Bulgarian Film Workers, emphasized. It covers a significant event in the life of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. Many parts of the movie will be used in the future in other works. A number of recommendations and opinions were expressed during the press conference on how to expedite the showing of the film to mass audiences.

5003

CSO: 2200/92

PEZLAR'S HARDLINE ARTICLE ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 May 83 p 7

[Text] Discounting the news about party congresses and plenary sessions of the Czech Central Committee, it is a rare occurrence that a Czech newspaper gives as much space to the statements of a man belonging to the highest level of the party hierarchy as the Slovak party newspaper PRAVDA did in the beginning of March. In three successive editions of this paper, on 3, 4 and 5 March, Ludvit Pezlar, secretary of the Central Committee of the Slovak Party, published three exceptionally long articles on one topic: the intensification of the ideological struggle in the world and the psychological war of imperialism against real socialism.

The articles say that the chief opponent in these attacks on socialist countries is the "Reagan phenomenon," but faithful to dialectic philosophy due credit is also given to the irresistible force of objective, logical development. Pezlar says that the "Reagan phenomenon" gradually describes, in addition to the ideological struggle, also the psychological war that imperialism has started against socialist countries. At the present time, ideological subversion is the most important weapon used in this psychological war, in addition to other weapons such as economic and political sanctions, financial blockades, provocative rearmament.

In this context Pezlar assigns extraordinary importance to the churches in Czechoslovakia, especially to the country's Catholic Church; here he sees a connection between the "Reagan phenomenon" and the "Wojtyla phenomenon," thus the Slovak party chief considers "the past year a time of most intensive pressures by the Vatican on the Catholic hierarchy" of the country, and the purpose of this pressure is alleged to have been to push the hierarchy into a conflict with the government. As chief example is cited the decree issued on 8 March 1982 for the Catholic clergy by the highest Vatican authority banning certain organizations of Catholic priests including, without doubt, the priests association "Pacem in Terris" in Czechoslovakia. This decree is considered to be "an attack against the peace association "Pacem in Terris" of the Catholic clergy because this association, on the basis of its peace activities and positive attitude toward socialism, is a thorn in the side of the organizers of the psychological war [against socialist states]."

It is not difficult to see in this particular part of the three statements by the Slovak party chief the main topic of its general theme: the domestic effect of the "Wojtyla phenomenon" in the service of the psychological war of world imperialism against socialist Czechoslovakia. This means that Pezlar has now moved into the line of defense which the district secretariats of Prague and Bratislava had established in an official statement of 25 July 1982 with the purpose of strengthening the position of the priests association "Pacem in Terris" in Czechoslovakia: this priests association is a peace organization and therefore cannot and may not be forbidden in the CSSR, nor may it be dissolved because working for peace is the "right and duty" of each citizen in the country.

If the peace commitment of the priests association is here emphasized so strongly, it cannot be overlooked that in its bylaws this organization describes as its first task its commitment to civic duties the realization of which, however, has to be "in harmony with the program of the National Front." This implies that all activities of the association are given one specific direction and a purpose that is imposed from the outside: the development of socialism. And the second major task mentioned in the bylaws, work in the interest of peace, thus also remains within the confines of "real socialism" whose basic elements Catholic priests cannot adopt.

For Pezlar in his high party position it would have been easy to go to the party archives and there find an appraisal of the priests association and the job given to it in an important document, namely "Suggestions Submitted by the Ministry of Culture to the Slovak Socialist Republic on the Basis of Information on the Political Situation of the Church in Slovakia, and of the Appropriate Decision by the Central Committee of Slovakia of 9 September 1969 in Regard to Short-Term and Long-Range Measures Aiming at the Realization of Policies of the State and the Communist Party Toward Believers, the Church and Religious Ideology." In this document the following is stated in regard to the Catholic Church: "In place of the now defunct peace movement of the Catholic clergy a new movement of the Catholic clergy is to be prepared as the basis for the work of that part of the clergy which stands on the side of socialism in order to paralyze the inappropriate influence of the Vatican, emigrants and the potentially unfavorable attitude of our own Catholic hierarchy." And furthermore: "A basic plan is to be prepared by the end of this year (1969)." These ideas characterize the "peace commitment" of the priests association in Czechoslovakia.

The close proximity of Poland and the influence extending from there to the Catholics in Czechoslovakia must then serve as a means to include the Vatican in the "Poland model" that was constructed in recent months, as if in a sandbox game, and to label the Vatican as the "enemy" in the same context. Thus the accusation arose that the Vatican uses the "Poland model" as an inspiration for the potential status and activity of the churches in a socialist country and that the Vatican is planning for the church in Czechoslovakia the role of an anti-socialist opposition and therefore thinks it necessary to suppress from the start and at any cost any loyal attitude toward the socialist state.

Pezlar thinks that the "Poland model" described by him has no chances of success. But it also sounds like a warning, or the party leader wants to instill a certain confidence in his comrades, when he points out that the Vatican has once before forced a conflict upon Czech Catholicism (meant by this is the conflict with Archbishop Beran which, however, was a conflict between the party leadership and the episcopate). Pezlar thinks that he must warn of the catastrophic consequences of a similar conflict "under today's conditions" because in his opinion only the centers of imperialism, the emigre clergy and the illegal underground at home could be interested in a conflict of this kind. Could it be that the communist party leadership in today's Czechoslovakia is also interested in it?

In this connection it is important to note that Pezlar refers to "the majority of Czech bishops." To be sure, among the five Catholic bishops there are two who have spoken out against the Vatican ban of the priests association. These two bishops have always gone along with the Prague party leadership. The vast majority of the clergy and parishioners, however, is on the side of the church. The Bratislava party chief also overlooks the fact that in their national history Czechs as well as Slovaks have learned to give in to outside pressure and still remain loyal to the cause in their convictions and bide their time. Nobody in the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia seeks a conflict with the communist state but the will to resist has grown and that precisely "under today's conditions." Also the people in Czechoslovakia have learned to defy the party; the confidence of religious believers has thus been strengthened. This today constitutes the power of the powerless.

8889

CSO: 2300/248

CSSR ESCALATES ATTACKS AGAINST CATHOLIC CHURCH

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 13 Apr 83 p 13

[Text] Once again "church clocks" are running quite differently in the communist camp. In Poland the government is getting ready to take advantage of the impending second "pilgrimage" of Pope John Paul II on 18 June as an expression of a successful "policy of normalization." In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, Poland's southern neighbor, the closer the pope's visit gets to their own front steps, the more aggressive become the attacks on the pope, the Vatican and the Catholic Church in their own country. Only a few days ago, Karel Hruza, former head of the Prague Church Office, accused Vatican policy of being a "crusade against peace and cooperation." He said that the Vatican is in the process of intending to organize a "fifth column within the ranks of the members of Czech Catholic orders."

Hard accusations of this kind against Vatican and church can be read more and more often in the Czech press. The "Slav pope", Karol Wojtyla, is accused of promoting "internal opposition against the countries of real socialism"--that includes Poland--and in these plans of Vatican policy toward Eastern countries Czechoslovakia is supposed to assume a "key role." But the increasing infighting between church and state in the CSSR is not limited to words alone. A few days ago there was a police action, obviously directed by the central authorities, against the Franciscan Order that is not officially recognized in the CSSR. There were house searches in several cities, religious literature was confiscated, and 20 Franciscans were taken into custody temporarily. In January, two young Catholics had already been given prison sentences for "illegal religious activities" in the Slovak capital of Bratislava. Repressive actions of this kind are by no means isolated cases. The respected NEW YORK TIMES estimated already in 1981 that the number of people sentenced to prison terms in the CSSR because of religious activities would be approximately 100, and the newspaper at that time spoke of a "year of religious court trials."

There are several reasons why communist authorities in the CSSR are intensifying their fight against the Catholic Church which has become almost a tradition. There is no doubt that they want to strengthen all dogmatic-atheist forces in the communist camp and thus counteract the influence of the Polish pope on a potential revitalization of the Catholic Church. Prague also feels, however, that it is challenged directly by the pope. In March 1982, the Vatican issued a decree that forbids priests all participation in political activities. The

Vatican made it especiallay clear--and this was underlined with great emphasis by the aged Archbishop Tomasek--that this decree applied also to the priests association "Pacem in Terris" which enjoys official sanction in the CSSR. With this association, a successor to the priests peace movement that was dissolved in 1968, the regime had created a willing tool with which it infiltrates the life of the church. As a recently discovered corruption scandal in Prague revealed, priests were enticed through bribes, a so-called "loyalty bonus," to join "Pacem in Terris". After the Vatican decree, however, many priests are reported to have left the association. In Slovakia, it is reported, only 5 percent of the priests now still belong to "Pacem in Terris".

But this is not the only sore point in the relations between state and church. Prague has repeatedly admitted that in the recent past commitment to church and religion has increased noticeably especially among young people. This development, however, gives no justification for speaking of an underground church in the CSSR even though the number of priests who are alleged to work illegally is estimated to be 500 and there are rumors of bishops having been ordained secretly.

The revitalization of church life against the background of government repression is the more remarkable in the CSSR because traditionally the position of the churches in the western key states of Bohemia and Moravia has always been weak in comparison with that in Slovakia. Hussite tradition as well as the pro-Habsburg attitude of the church during the time of the counter-reformation have discredited the Catholic Church far beyond intellectual circles. Tomas Masaryk, the founder of the first republic, left the church in the last century. He made the statement that reads like a political program: "We have made our accounting with Habsburg and we shall do so with Rome." In 1920 a national church independent of the Vatican was started which had as many as 1 million members. The emphasis on the authority of the clergy in the times when under Hitler's auspices Slovakia was independent could likewise not have done much to enhance the reputation of the Catholic Church. It is no surprise then that communist atheist propaganda found little resistance in the CSSR for a long time and that religious forces and ideas found no roots in the reform movement of 1968.

But then the Catholic Church in the CSSR was weakened, in addition, through a series of concrete government measures. The practice of limiting the number of young men admitted to theological studies led to an acute shortage of priests. Religious education was made difficult by many petty restrictions and by keeping the circulation of religious literature on a low level. The hierarchical order of the church was weakened when the government refused to give its consent to the appointment of new bishops whenever candidates agreeable to the government could not be found. Today many dioceses have no bishops at all or only by temporary arrangement. The relation between church and state in the CSSR remains therefore in a state of balance that is weighed down by ideological-political preconditions. There are no indications that this situation will improve during the pontificate of the Slavic pope.

CSSR ESCALATES SUPPRESSION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 27 Apr 83 p 3

[Text] (Zurich) At the end of March, actions against the Catholic Church in the CSSR reached a new climax with the arrest of 20 Franciscan monks. After severe interrogations, 15 of them were set free, the remaining five--the Provincial Kubicek, Fathers Moc, Tuma, Pometlo and Mazanec--were retained in custody. In Bratislava the police could produce no search warrants, documents of this kind are avoided by the authorities. The action was centrally directed, it took place in different places at the same time. In Prague, a young member of the order, Pavel Locka, offered resistance to the house searches, he was handcuffed to a radiator and then led away for interrogation. Although no reasons for this action were given, it can be concluded with certainty that the charge will be involvement in religious activities.

Like the other religious orders, the Franciscans have never been dissolved legally, but in practice they were liquidated in 1950. Their monasteries were confiscated, some members of the order were put in prison, others were sent to labor camps, the younger members were sent home. After a while, all of them returned to their home towns, took civilian jobs and by living among the population became a blessing for the church. Many young people gathered around them and the most annoying aspect for the dictatorship became the fact that this kind of life was now beyond government control. This is the real reason of the conflict, "subversive activity" permits the communist judicial system to pass sentences under the pretense of a court trial.

Strategy and tactics in the fight against the church are directed toward preserving on the outside the appearance of religious freedom and utilizing what is left of church activities in order to use the clergy, as far as possible, for making the church subservient to party dictatorship and control until the gradual dissolution of the church comes about. The fight is waged secretly in most cases and its purpose is to give the impression that there is a "secret church" but the real point is that anything that does not agree with the church structure approved by the party is classified by the party as "illegal," as "underground."

A small part of the Catholic clergy has submitted to this church policy, it is organized in the "Pacem in Terris" movement (PIT), all important honors and positions are reserved for members of this organization. After the Vatican

in March of last year forbade priests to participate in organizations of this kind, the Church Office and the party reacted by saying that this was a regular "declaration of war" by Rome, but this reaction served to make the real purpose of PIT absolutely clear. Party and government authorities, meanwhile, are trying to support with the help of the police their own cadres among the clergy in order to have their own inside tools available. Priests were questioned directly about their attitude toward PIT, and public statements were made that if the Vatican decree were applied to practice, this would be equivalent to a "violation" of CSSR sovereignty.

Priests Peace Movement Above Church Structure

At the dean's meeting of Kosice City (Kaschau) in January the chairman of the church board of supervisors asked the priests in attendance to give their opinion on "Pacem in Terris." After a lengthy and embarrassing period of silence an older priest said: "The church lived before we were on earth and before there was a PIT. It is our duty to live and work for the unity with the chief shepherd of the church. We must make every effort to see to it that the church survives after we are gone," and the response was loud applause. An attempt by Dr Karab, the chairman, to ask those present for their opinion in alphabetical order brought no results, the first priest asked did not even get up, the meeting had to be broken off.

An important role in this controversy is played by the only Catholic newspaper KATOLICKE NOVINY [Catholic News] whose Czech edition has now become PIT's official mouthpiece after Cardinal Tomasek withdrew church approval from it. In February the Slovak edition published an article attributed to Bishop Gabris of Tyrnau in which the bishop is alleged to have paid high tribute to PIT during the New Year's reception. A request by the bishop to publish corrections was not printed in the paper, he himself was forbidden to send out a clarifying letter so that his clergy could be informed of the true facts only by word of mouth.

In this struggle to make the Vatican decree stick there have been casualties and fatalities on both sides. The best known among them is Church Secretary Hruza who was dismissed from his job because, as it was put, money which had been allotted to members of "Pacem in Terris" had not been paid out appropriately by his office. Where this money has gone nobody knows. Among the clergy that has remained in office and especially in the parishes the front lines are now drawn more sharply, but it is not possible to make a general statement about the personal attitude of each PIT member.

The one development that alarms party and government in the CSSR is the fact of a religious revitalization especially among the young people, and here again among students. Observers in East and West erroneously connect this development with Karol Wojtila, the first Slav pope. In fact, the religious renaissance began already in the 70's and can therefore not simply be explained by the "Polish era" in the papacy, even though this era might have contributed to a revitalization of faith in Slovakia and--to a much lesser degree--even in liberal-minded Bohemia.

Vatican Makes Surprise Offer of Dialog

In this situation the offer by the Vatican to resume talks with the Czech government came as a surprise especially since the letter from Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli to Cardinal Tomasek and the Prague government states that the talks should not be a mere resumption of casual contacts. Negotiation topics mentioned by Casaroli are the nomination of new bishops, the definition of their authority, the training of new priests, the status of religious orders, religious publications and matters of this kind. So far, Prague has shown no noticeable reaction, unless the continuation of police repression is to be interpreted as the answer. A review of events since the 1950's gives reason to assume that time is on the side of the church, not on the side of government ideology. This ideology still has the power but no longer the vitality and power of conviction, whereas 20 years ago impending demise was predicted for the Catholic Church because of persecution and bloodletting.

8889

CSO: 2300/240

TRADE UNION RESOLUTION ON CARDS EXCHANGE

AU161319 Prague PRACE in Czech 13 May 83 p 1

["Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Trade Union Council; On the Exchange of Membership Cards of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement"]

[Text] The validity of the existing membership cards of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement [ROH] expires in 1983. The preparation of the exchange, which will culminate in the handing out of new ROH membership cards in the ROH's primary organizations at the membership meetings in December 1983 and January 1984, is a politically significant event in the life of the entire ROH.

The 10th All-Trade Union Congress determined to concentrate all efforts in the coming period on extensively developing the ROH's role and co-responsibility for the further construction of the socialist society, on distinctly deepening the trade unions' active share in the implementation of the program of the 16th CPCZ Congress.

The year 1983 is of fundamental importance for restoring the dynamism of the development of the national economy. This requires from the ROH that its mass-political, ideo-educational and political-organizational work contributes more effectively to resolving the effectiveness of social production, to improving the all-round care for the working people and ensuring their legitimate interests and needs in harmony with the possibilities and objectives of an advanced socialist society.

A consistent realization of these needs requires that trade union agencies, and especially the ROH primary organizations, direct their attention in the period of the preparation of the exchange of ROH membership cards to thoroughly acquainting members with the ROH statutes and, in particular, with the meaning of membership in trade unions, with the rights and duties of the ROH members, with the objectives and tasks of an ROH primary organization when implementing the socioeconomic program for the development of society adopted by the 16th CPCZ Congress. It also requires them to direct their attention to the conditions of the ROH worked out by the 10th All-Trade Union Congress.

The young people in particular have to be shown by means of concrete examples the importance of socialist trade unions in the struggle of the workers class and the other working people for the socialist development of their fatherland, for the further economic and social progress and for maintaining lasting peace in the world at a time when world imperialism is escalating its efforts to weaken the unity of the socialist community and is exposing the world to the threat of nuclear war.

The preparation of the exchange of ROH membership cards will have to be combined with a broad political and agitation campaign oriented toward increasing the participation of workers, technicians and other working people in ensuring the fulfillment of the tasks of the 1983 economic plan and discussing the 1984 draft plan. With the organization of informal discussions in work collectives all ROH members will be given the opportunity of expressing their views and suggestions aimed at eliminating shortcomings, which in some cases prevent the working people's activity from being effectively developed and which weaken the effectiveness of the work of the primary trade union organization and the entire ROH.

It is particularly important that members' suggestions, views and recommendations be made a full use of in the ROH's primary organizations to improve the overall activity of the organization, and when preparing plans of activity, collective contracts and the adoption of the counterplan for 1984.

It is the task of the higher all-trade union and individual trade union agencies to follow and assess the state of the preparation and the course of the exchange of ROH membership cards. They must give efficient and differentiated assistance to ROH primary organizations and they must implement immediately and with initiative the working people's proposals and recommendations for increasing the ROH's co-responsibility for and share in the realization of the 17th CPCZ Congress conclusions.

The Presidium of the Central Trade Union Council expects from all ROH agencies, functionaries and members that they will apply all their efforts and abilities to ensuring this politically important task.

CSO: 2400/297

PAPER REFUTES WESTERN REPORT ON MILITARY SITUATION

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 30 Apr 83 p 11

/Article by B.I.B.: "They Would Like To Know Everything"/

/Text/ In one of the Western newspapers there was a lengthy article entitled, "The Hungarian Contingent of the Warsaw (Pact) Military Coalition". The intent of the author of this article, a certain Laszlo Hari, was to give a comprehensive picture of the Hungarian People's Army. Under the guise of professionalism and of being well-informed, the author was attempting to systematize his knowledge of the present state, organizational makeup and preparedness of the Hungarian People's Army. Naturally, his presentation of this information, which he had gathered from various sources, is filled with the usual one-sided, yet cleverly manipulated political commentary characteristic of the Western press and was by no means free of hostility and distortions. A certain fraction of the collection of data and information compiled and published in the article more or less reflects the truth. The majority of its observations, however, are highly incomplete, inaccurate and some are even completely untrue. The most striking among the many improvised and unprofessional statements is a list according to which an artillery division of the Hungarian People's Army consists of an air defense regiment, a rocket brigade, five motorized rifle divisions (!) and an airborne battalion. This kind of childishly incoherent "expert knowledge", of course, makes one smile, and would make even a reader who is completely unfamiliar with military terminology wrinkle his forehead in confusion, although he could not be blamed even if he chose to simply cast aside a paper which contains such a perplexed argumentation.

Dangerous Curiosity

Upon thorough examination of the article it becomes apparent, however, that the author is feverishly trying to give the impression of being well-informed. He attempts to present himself as one who has authoritative knowledge of virtually every important piece of date and fact. Naturally, we will not do him the favor of giving a thorough, paragraph-by-paragraph response to the conclusions of his article and thereby of helping him confirm which of his statements reflect the truth and which facts and data are false or fabricated. One reason why we are not going to do this is that if anything, the author's painful efforts have unintentionally revealed that he and his employers would

like to know everything. Everything which has to do with the organizational makeup, equipment, weaponry and preparedness of our people's army,

From where do such "well-informed" people obtain their information? From several sources. They closely study our military newspapers and periodicals which, of course, offer little information that could be of any use to them. Hence they also resort to other methods. Their agents disguised as tourists, commercial travellers, or perhaps as newsreporters and sports leaders are systematically and intensively kept busy to collect as much information as possible about the units and institutions of our people's army.

Our soldiers are bound to secrecy by their pledge under oath and by statutory regulations. New recruits are informed of their duties in this regard already during their first few days in the service. The danger of secrets becoming deliberately divulged, therefore, is minimal. For every honest citizen understands the seriousness of the well-known truth that handing over military and state secrets is a serious crime: it amounts to treason.

Yet, enemy agents are not working completely in vain. Unfortunately, there are still some careless babble-mouths among us who like to brag about how well-informed they are and who with gross negligence break even the most basic rules of secrecy, people who, although unintentionally, make it easier for the enemy to collect intelligence information. It is an old truth, that most enemy agents are not trying to gain access to the vaults where secret documents of the general staff are kept because they know that such an attempt would be an exercise in futility. Instead, by gathering hundreds and hundreds of lesser or greater pieces of intelligence they combine relatively insignificant data to piece together usable information.

Let us Guard Our Secrets

The rules of vigilance and secrecy are binding both on and off post. Only those authorized may have access to information that concerns the combat value, weaponry and readiness of our armed forces; they are nobody else's business. They may not be revealed even to people whom otherwise we would consider perfectly reliable.

There has been frequent scepticism regarding the relevance of all this secrecy, after all, the argument goes, today the photosensitive cells of intelligence-gathering space objects can see and reconnoiter everything. This reasoning, however, is by no means valid. Spy satellites are capable of reconnoitering many things but not nearly everything. Among other things they are unable to provide an accurate account of data pertaining to the tactical technics of an army's weapon systems, of the combat-readiness indicators, training and moral-political status of subunits and units and of several other important factors. It is by no accident that the bosses of Western intelligence organizations are spending millions on trying to obtain military data unobtainable by spy satellites, nor is it by accident that they employ hundreds and hundreds of professional and special agents.

Rather than making it easier for them, let us work to foil and uncover their activities.

HUNGARY

MORE APPLICANTS FOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL NEEDED

Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 83 p 25

[Article by Istvan Bela Bertalan: "The Quality of Officers: There is a Need for More Applicants; High School Military Academies"]

[Text] In the heroic age of the Hungarian Peoples Army, between 1949 and 1951, it often occurred that a recruit inducted hardly 2 or 3 months before received his officer's stripes from one day to the next--naturally, only those young men who were morally and politically irreproachable and who were prepared and able to fulfill the position. In addition to the young workers and peasants trained at the Kossuth Academy, hundreds and thousands of officers who were promoted in this way received responsible troop and staff assignments. The majority of them kept pace with the rapidly growing requirements through will power, love of responsibility and ceaseless study. A smaller percentage did not measure up to expectations and left the army within a few years.

Many of those who successfully met the challenge received advanced training, and also stood their ground in the highest-level leadership positions in the army. Today, many of them still serve as high-ranking assigned officers and generals of the people's army.

Its Attraction Has Weakened

Who may become an army officer today? In accordance with the Laws in effect, a Hungarian citizen who is irreproachable and has no criminal record and who is suitable and meets other requirements as determined by the Minister of National Defense may become a professional officer in the people's army.

Qualified to become professional army officers are those who 1. Passed a state examination or completed an officers training course either at a foreign or domestic military academy or on a military scholarship at a foreign or domestic institution of higher education; 2. Received professional training at either a foreign or domestic civilian college or university which--after completion of the prescribed military course--qualifies them to fulfill the post of an officer; 3. Are re-enlisted officers of the people's army or have the rank of reserve officer in the armed forces; 4. Are professional warrant officers having passed the prescribed officers examination. (It is necessary to obtain a high school diploma prior to this.)

What are the major responsibilities that a professional army officer assumes today?

The Ministry of Defense directive concerning this states: "Military service to the homeland and its people and the protection of the political, social and economic system of the Hungarian Peoples Republic is the duty--on the basis of their freely chosen vocation--of the military and the professional members of the effective armed forces and which--true to their vow--they are obligated to fulfill loyally and with devotion extending to self-sacrifice."

In numerous countries it may be observed that the attraction of a professional military career has decreased and not increased during the course of the past decade. According to some views, this is a worldwide phenomenon which is related to the fact that modern man is less amenable to the assumption of the responsibilities associated with a military profession. It is true that the situation is far from simple. According to data released in the Soviet military press, the number of young men requesting admission to the officers training institutions of the Soviet army exceeds the demand four- to five-fold, and even ten-fold in certain units. The situation is similar in Bulgaria. Generally the extent of over-applications to the military academies of the other member states of the Warsaw Pact is more modest.

In our country, it would definitely be more favorable if we could select the most suitable applicants from a larger pool than we have at present. Further, the number of applicants who prove suitable for fulfilling the duties of an officer is less than what is desired. The appeal of becoming a professional fighter pilot is rather great which, without a doubt, was reinforced by the popularity and career of the first Hungarian astronaut. However, only a portion of the applicants is able to meet the educational, physical, health and other requirements. Less interest is shown by the youth choosing an officer's career toward certain branches of the military. For example, relatively few want to become officers in the mechanized infantry. Generally, the explanation for this is that a significant number of young men who are attracted to a military profession have deficient or mistaken knowledge and information about how different the mechanized infantry is today as compared to the infantry of the past. After all, today the mechanized infantry is outfitted with modern instruments and armaments, some of which are automatic and electronic; the position and role they occupy in the army and their opportunities have been comprehensively realized. The situation is similar in the case of several other traditional branches of the military.

Skilled Young Workers Are Also Needed

Presently there is a need for more applicants to the military academies also because the majority of the officers who began their careers 30 to 35 years ago either have reached retirement age or shortly will, and must be replaced by suitable young men. Concern is somewhat lessened by the system of high school military academies. In these academies, the young men who are attracted to the military profession consciously prepare for an officer's career during the course of their studies. After graduation, an overwhelming majority--approximately 85 percent--continue their studies at one of the military academies. On the basis of good results, newer high school military academies will open their doors to young men this year. The options of officer candidates are likewise increased by the opportunity which, with the aid of the high school to

of the army, allows skilled young workers who have not completed high school to become students at any military academy--after completion of a preparatory course.

Experts are paying attention to improving the qualitative composition of the students admitted to the military academies and especially towards the entrance of students with ever better scholastic proficiency. The rapid pace of modernization of the various branches of the people's army and the increased demands of leadership require that more and more talented young men choose the military as a profession--even more so because in a given situation, the lives and fates of hundreds and thousands of men could depend on the decisions of even low- and mid-ranking military leaders. It is a professional-military and simultaneously social interest that gifted young men with above-average capabilities embark on a professional military career.

A suitable quality of officer replacements is indispensable, not merely in possibly extraordinary situations from the viewpoint of leading fighting troops, but also because of the great demands which are made on military leaders in peacetime. The commander must be able to successfully instruct and effectively train his subordinates and must also possess the skills and aptitude necessary for battlefield leadership. The talent for quick and realistic evaluation and decision-making is also indispensable. For the military leader to fulfill his manifold tasks it is also essential that he have the appropriate pedagogical and psychological training and familiarity with technology and economics. It is obvious that only those officers who have suitable capabilities and who are thoroughly trained can meet the wide spectrum of demands.

Rights and Responsibilities

Compared to civilian institutions of higher education, general and scholastic discipline at the military academies is stricter. Accordingly, the scholastic average is two- to three-tenths higher than the grade-point averages of students at civilian universities. The majority of the officer candidates do not merely accept this but also consider it natural. Whoever is unable to meet the standards must leave the academy.

The officers of the Hungarian People's Army do not have any special privileges. Their salaries and standard of living do not exceed the average level typical for the technical intelligentsia. Their civic rights in no way differ from those of their fellow countrymen. However, their responsibilities--stemming from the nature of their profession--are stricter and more far-reaching. When an officer (and in general, a soldier) is accorded recognition or a decoration, he acknowledges the consideration toward him by saying, "I serve the working people!" It truly is a service to be an officer of the Hungarian People's Army: it is the honorable, responsible and loyal service to the people and cause of socialist society.

9956

CSO: 2500/193

NIK OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON SOLIDARITY'S FINANCIAL SITUATION

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Apr 83 p 6

[Interview with Stanislaw Krysz, press spokesman for the Supreme Chamber of Control, by Barbara Drozd; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] The Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] has recently been processing the findings of a Solidarity union audit. What was the reason for the audit?

[Answer] The question of Solidarity's finances was raised at numerous meetings and in many discussions after the imposition of martial law and the suspension of trade union activity. The NIK was also approached on this matter. Therefore, in the fourth quarter of last year, NIK branch offices checked the files of 13 Solidarity units, including 9 regional boards, 2 regional divisions and 2 interfactory workers' commissions.

[Question] Was the audit more difficult to make because of the suspension of union activity?

[Answer] It certainly was not a routine check. First of all, inspectors may obtain explanations from persons in charge of individual areas of activity under normal circumstances. In this case these opportunities were limited; the inspectors could get very little information from the employees of Solidarity's finance and bookkeeping sections. Not infrequently, people refused to supply correct information.

Second, we can usually examine all books and documents, but the Solidarity books had many gaps; they were kept in a negligent way and were full of inaccuracies.

Third, our inspections usually end with an audit report which contains our conclusions and which is addressed to the audited organization. The organization is then obliged to rectify the irregularities revealed by the inspection. In this case, this was out of the question.

[Question] What was the audit's outcome?

[Answer] In all cases where financial irregularities were detected, the prosecuting agencies were notified in order to pursue the matter further. The public has been informed of that. One example is the case of the 80 million zloty which was entered in the books as a deposit, but which was collected from the bank by Jozef Pinior, the Lower Silesian region's financial spokesman.

I also see a broader significance for the NIK audit. Much has already been said and written about Solidarity finances, although it was mostly based on hearsay. Our analysis makes it possible to take an objective look, based on the dissolved union's documents, and this can serve as the basis for a more complete evaluation.

[Question] Exactly what areas of Solidarity activity did you scrutinize?

[Answer] We concentrated on finances and bookkeeping, where the evidence was fairly complete. We looked separately at spending for propaganda activities and the wages for full-time staff, and we also obtained some data regarding the union's organizational structure.

[Question] What did you find?

[Answer] The documents show that propaganda and publishing activities definitely played a dominant part in Solidarity's spending. For example, it absorbed 32 percent of all money in the Gdansk region, 38 percent in Wielkopolska, and 21.5 percent in the Kielce chapter. An average of 32 percent of all money for four regions (the above-mentioned plus Opole) went for publishing and propaganda. Overall, more than 111 million zloty were spent in the four regions during the reviewed period, 34 million of which was channeled into propaganda.

By contrast, outlays for welfare activities in 6 other chapters totaled 1.2 million zloty, or less than 2 percent, of the total of 70 million.

The figures are not always comparable because of gaps in the books, but they clearly point to the general structure of expenditures. Even these incomplete data attest to the predominantly political nature of Solidarity's activity.

[Question] What were the sources of Solidarity's income?

[Answer] Membership fees accounted for 90 percent of the income; the rest came from all kinds of donations, including those from abroad.

The 13 local Solidarity boards we examined recorded a total income of 793 million zloty during the reviewed period. Out of this sum, over 351 million was spent. As of 12 December 1981, the chapters examined had nearly 150 million zloty in their banking accounts. I am giving these figures to show that they were no trifling sums.

[Question] You mentioned the cost of employing the full-time staff. How high was it?

[Answer] This was the second biggest item in Solidarity's expenses, following propaganda activities. The full-time staff was growing all the time, especially in 1981. In Wroclaw, for example, the Solidarity regional executive payroll grew from 9 people in February 1981 to 203 in November of that year, and in the Malopolska region, the number grew from 25 full-time staffers in December 1980 to 187 in November 1981. These figures concern only the people on the payroll of the regional executive boards and do not include the full-time employees of the union's factory and interfactory organizations.

On the basis of incomplete data it can be estimated that the pay for the full-time staff accounted for some 30-40 percent of all expenditures.

The cost of running the apparatus included wages, business trip expenses and also advances taken for financing current activity. The latter sum arouses the most objections because of the amount involved, the relevant records and, especially, the expense account vouchers or rather, the lack thereof.

Let me give you an example. In the Legnica chapter, the amount of an advance ranged from 500 to 500,000 zloty, despite the fact that the upper limit for an advance was 5,000 zloty under the chapter's rules.

The overall amount of unaccounted-for advances in four of the organizational units examined totaled 7.7 million zloty out of total expenses of 109.9 million.

Conclusions reached in the NIK audit show how far the practice of Solidarity's activity departed from the slogans voiced by this organization. It is always the case that the goals for which an organization spends its money is the best measure of its true nature.

CSO: 2600/883

ARMY DAILY VIEWS TRADE UNION SITUATION

AU191719 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 14-15 May 83 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Wieslaw Rogowski: "Reality and Absurdity"]

[Text] The political situation is as follows: As a result of the Sejm's legal disbandment of all trade unions, all the opposition and counter-revolutionary forces which were centered around "Solidarity" lost their legal organizational basis. "Solidarity" was exploited by these forces for their own ends and they eventually managed to transform it into a political instrument with which to put pressure on the authorities. They even transformed it into a backup organization which was theirs to command in order to strike at the economy and the foundations of the state through strikes, demonstrations and a propaganda which was more obsessive and brutal than ever before.

Remaining trade union streams, composed of branch members and autonomists, also, as we know, ceased to exist. This was the particular high price which had to be paid to calm things down and the result of the political logic which was behind the memorable decisions which were made. However, we must remember that branch trade unions were in the nature of things opposed to the political designs and goals of the leadership of "Solidarity," and that the same was true of the autonomists. If things had been different, then these two distinct streams, which are worthy of respect, would not have existed. All their attempts to induce "Solidarity" to renounce its political ambitions, accept the call to cooperate and proceed to create unity within the trade union movement were rejected.

This is why, as we know, a few bitter clashes between the law, the state and the intentions of the leaders of "Solidarity" were inevitable. The first of these was the introduction of martial law. The Sejm law on trade unions was also provoked if not completely forced into being by them. This law examines the ways in which trade unions could be formed again and legalized after 13 December 1981.

These activities were, after all, an obvious reply to the original situation created with the full premeditation of the leaders of the counterrevolutionary movement within "Solidarity." Today all other interpretations will simply be false if they do not take into consideration this aspect of

the matter. This is why attempts at viewing the role of trade unions, their recent history and the cost of the changes made as well as the price they were forced to pay for them would be absurd in view of the realities and the real reasons and effects behind recent political options.

The organizational situation is, on the other hand, as follows: There are over 12,000 trade union organizations and over 2 million union members, despite the great pressure being exerted to boycott and the fact that for many people the very word "union member" and the very concept behind "trade union" seems unclear to this day since they remember the equally brutal way in which "Solidarity" was almost transformed into a party by political groups of anticommunists and their activists. They can also remember the accusations made against branch members, autonomists and the organizations of the former Central Council of Trade Unions [CRZZ]. One can therefore understand both the restraint and the reserve with which many workers view the new trade union movement. But despite this, these 2 million people are the heralds of further positive changes. There is no other road, and there can be no other logical development.

Even more absurd would be any attempts to fan the atmosphere, to invent some sort of new concepts, reconcile and recruit all kinds of castoffs from various political groups who have nothing in common with the real balance of forces in the country, or the construction of some kind of new so-called structures like castles in the sand together with these people. No one can rely on the crowds of people who are still undecided. They have already stopped supporting the former idols but have still not expressed their views on the proposal for legal trade unions. We need time and peace so that differences of views can be smoothed over along with moods and hopes. We need time and work, without which there is no point to anything.

The ideological and social situation arising from the aforementioned prerequisites is not therefore a happy picture, but it also explains why certain people like Lech Walesa try to strike out neurotically in various directions so that they will not be forgotten or get pushed to the limits of public affairs and beyond them even in their own estimation. Publicity abroad is not the same as social support at home, while loud demonstrations of views on radio stations and in newspapers that are not Polish but are anticommunist do not serve the fatherland. Many people are capable of doing a lot of talking about Poland but to serve it with humility and not expect rewards or promotion is much more difficult. Some people, on the other hand, simply could not manage to do this.

There is, therefore, still a chasm between the foundations on which people are building the first stages of a new order, a reformed socialist and state reality, and the foundations on which others are attempting to amass real weapons, political ammunition and persuade young hotheads to openly make "trouble" on the streets.

Some people, according to "unofficial" ideologists, do not accept the current situation in Poland or the calls for normality and want to discredit the new trade union movement as a regime-ruled one, that is, one which is suspect,

unreal and opposed to the interests of the masses. After all, even "Solidarity," which transformed itself after such a short period of incubation amid foreign and cancerous bodies, departed from the pursuit of the interests of the working people and ruined the economy. It does not matter what made it do this, but what does matter is that it was completely ruthless in doing it. Its activities were aided by capitalist countries, and only history will show us who drew on these funds, how much and why. Had the kind of regime which this organization suggested, or rather its political leaders and the bodies which were controlling it behind the workers' backs, come into power, then I think that all the legal deviations which occurred in the history of the Polish People's Republic would have seemed like child's play compared to all the forecasts of hangings without court hearings and convictions without any chance of defense and people going to labor camps without reason.

The interests of the work force in factories and other plants must today depend on smoothing out the difficulties which are causing problems with wages, shopping and household supplies in general as quickly as possible. We need peace and an effort to organize production on the basis of logic and sense. We must have joint activities within the economy and cooperation in the state because otherwise even the most democratic changes will be useless if people are going to be constantly worried, depressed or upset. One must be fond of life in order to live better and more happily, but there is no need for excessive riches for life to seem good. All that is essential is good coexistence, and this can be achieved. This is also the humanistic goal of the socialist reform and its activities, and it is the very essence of this social and ethical concept.

Whatever we may say about the nervous way in which moods fluctuate or the still unstable foundations of the economy, we must, after all, remember that we must not only live in these conditions but also adjust our lives to them. We must not only reconstruct the past potential for development, but we must simply create it from scratch in accordance with the changed conditions. Who would then find the need for a political storm or a new twist in history which could once more bring obscurity back to the restless horizon? It is therefore more important to strengthen the peace we have at present and to restore the order we should have.

Working people take part in social activities above all through the process of work, its fruits and the way they relate to the distribution of these goods. Justice, we say, is needed, but the justice of facts rather than ideas, and facts which are often ordinary daily facts. We speak of goodwill, and this is not only a nice word but also a way of living together. We hear the word freedom which is, after all, a deliverance from poverty. So how can we achieve all this? By street unrest and by clamoring at rallies, by creating new political structures and attempting to activate political reaction at home and abroad to reject the principles of peace, cooperation and agreement? There are no ideal people on either side nor are there any bronze statues; these can only be found in museums. But there are living, thinking, working people who also work for others. Why should we therefore reject that which history has given us, a safe departure from the worst possible thing, from the threshold of civil war, economic misfortune and unrest among people, the class system and society which makes all human activities possible? Whom does this concern so much? If not us as individuals, then who? We must, after all, consider this!

Work forces would once more be divided and preliminary measures to unite them have already been drawn up. A trade union cannot be an assembly of contradictions and people in conflict with one another; it must be a team or a group that is united by work as its only goal. Unity within the unions is also in keeping with this concept.

The new trade unions, which are already a Polish reality and were organized in accordance with the new principles, are and will be the kind of unions that their members will make them. This is an important process and one that is, after all, becoming broader and more and more progressive. Attempts to place a new obstacle before this steam are not and will not be wise, whereas all plans to introduce new divisions, conflicts and opposition among working people do not serve Poland because they serve another party. Do they serve the egotism of the former leaders of "Solidarity?" Or the obstinacy of anticommunist fanatics? Or the people who press the button across the ocean in order to create unrest in Poland? Answer this yourselves.

CSO: 2600/909

POLAND

COMMENTATOR ASSESSES POLISH POWER HIERARCHY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 May 83 p 7

[Article by Joerg Bremer: "Who is in Power in Poland? Jaruzelski's Moderate Course and his Opponents"]

[Text] In strictly legal terms, the Military Council of National Salvation is still in power in Poland even after the suspension of martial law. Yet little has been heard of this body recently. What is more, it stated in its first proclamation of 13 December 1981, that it was an interim body which would not infringe upon legitimate authority; the task of the Military Council was to contain the attack upon the state and to bring stability to the situation. According to its propaganda on the radio and in the press, the situation in Poland is now stable, having reached a point where the conditions for the pope's visit have been created, something quite different from last August when Pope Paul II had once again to be disinvited. Yet even at that time, the internal organ of the Military Council--the directorate--was no longer in session. Since July 1982, Stefan Olszowski is no longer the secretary of the Central Committee, having instead been appointed minister for foreign affairs and no longer a member of the directorate. According to informed sources, the directorate has not since then been in session.

It was very evident at that time that it was the pragmaticians in the ministries who were carrying the main effort; they were doing the planning and making the proposals to the chairman of the Military Council, General Jaruzelski, and it was he who made the decisions. Strengthened by pressure from fraternal socialist countries, the party, as early as last fall, was beginning to put up repeated objections to its being bypassed. The Politburo raised its protest when the new trade union law was drafted without its input and then enacted in the parliament. Yet the party grew in strength as the pragmatic concepts--as, for example, in economic policy--failed to take effect as quickly as seemed necessary in the pressing crisis. The party's influence made itself once again clear for the first time when the government of General Jaruzelski was unsuccessful in carrying out the suspension of martial law in December 1982. Yet the fact that the party thrust itself forward more on the basis of historically established rights rather than as the vanguard with ideas for overcoming the crisis, was manifest as early as the end of October at the 10th plenary session of the Central Committee. The barrage of reports from the party well into this year has been more revealing of its multiplicity of opinions than of any concept

of crisis management. The question then is, in what way does the party share in governing Poland?

This question is probably posed incorrectly. What is becoming increasingly clear is that within the military, only those persons are permitted to act as spokesmen, who are also reliable party members. The theory earlier advanced that the military had assumed power on 13 December 1981 in order to preserve the country from a subversive "Solidarity" as well as from untenable party policy, does not hold true. On 13 December, party policy was in effect and, in fact, of a very special sort: party policy in uniform. In its senior ranks, the members of the military are also party activists. They are, as a rule, representative of the more conservative wing, which has to do with the fact that most of them did a part of their training with the fraternal Soviet Army. It can also be no coincidence that the country's military journal, with its regional editions in every military district, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, is among the most conservative of Polish newspapers. The importance which this paper assumes to itself can be measured from the remark of one of its leading editors that, at the time of the major unrests in Poland, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI was repeatedly able to persuade friendly governments that Poland's party could be relied upon.

Even when the lists of those in power are looked at closely, it becomes clear that the senior officers occupy the Politburo or the secretariat of the Central Committee by way of the army's main directorate. General Jaruzelski himself is typical of this fusion of the party and the army. Ever since his takeover of power, he has been able to bring political confidantes, in or out of uniform, into the most important positions. Thus, in late March, a prominent opponent of Jaruzelski, General Moczar, was relieved of his post as president of the Supreme Review Board and Major General Hupalowski appointed to that position, an officer reputed to be a close friend of Jaruzelski. This office has taken on new importance since the fall of 1980 when the Supreme Review Board was made subordinate to the parliament with the task of exploring corruption and irregularities in the state as well as in the party. Earlier it had been linked to the government and heavily constrained in its authority. Just recently, Hupalowski relieved the previous deputy, Piatowski, a holdover from Moczar's tenure, to replace him with a new man who commands his confidence, the university-trained economist, Jan Antosik. The question of who holds power in Poland is not so much one of possession of military or party rank so much as which group of persons and their interests.

In saying this, there is no doubt of the fact that General Jaruzelski is the man to whose doorstep all questions eventually find their way, whether substantive issues or personnel questions. It is therefore critical for him to fill as many positions as possible with his own loyalists. Only the broadest possible spectrum of adherents will enable Jaruzelski to carry out his policy of moderation -- a more difficult one because it is a generally less attractive policy. This is why it was important last year to find a partner in the "Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth" (PRON), which could present his ideas to the general public. PRON turned out to be too weak an instrument, mainly because Jaruzelski was unable to impose upon the party those goals which he shared with the Patriotic Movement (suspension of martial law by the end of 1982). Moreover, Jaru-

zelski underestimated his lack of popularity among the people, so that to stabilize his power, he was forced to have recourse to those forces in the party which were actually inclined to work against him politically.

It is true that Jaruzelski has encountered only negative coalitions among his opponents in the party, the army and the security apparatus. Jaruzelski's opponents have not yet been able to agree upon a concept to counter his own; Jaruzelski himself has been able to blunt the edge of his opposition through his administrative appointments. Olszowski became foreign minister and, as a member of the cabinet, must abide by the policies of the head of government; much the same has happened with the party hardliners Grabski and Kociolek, who were dispatched to East Berlin and to Moscow. Grabski is reputed to have coined the phrase applicable to his political opponents in the party, when he recently grumbled in Warsaw that "Rakowski and his Jews were in charge."

Certainly included among the inner circle around Jaruzelski are Vice Premier Rakowski, Politburo member Barcikowski and Minister of the Interior Kiszczak, who now, on the strength of his personal connections through the central military directorate, is ambitious for control of the staff structure at the senior ranks of the army. This seems to comprise the innermost circle of prominent personalities; at the periphery of this circle might be placed government press spokesman Urban who, despite all criticism of his cynicism, has succeeded in building up something approaching his own propaganda apparatus. His amicable professional relations with leading Polish journalists, his willingness to engage in dialog with them and others, has made his own efforts appear more successful than those of Glowczyk, the Central Committee member responsible for propaganda. Also significant is the increasing importance of the official government newspaper, RZECZPOPOLITA, whose efforts at objectivity have made it successfully competitive with the party journal, TRYBUNA LUDU. Important editorials appearing in the former journal are then frequently picked up by the party press. The makeup of the circle of political figures in the apparatus opposed to Jaruzelski is difficult to determine. For example, there still appear to be groups even today who would like to prevent the visit of the pope. Following numerous provocations aimed at turning peaceful demonstrations into violent ones, and especially the break-in by what are still "parties unknown" into the monastery of St. Martin in Warsaw, one would have to suspect that the security services do not always act in the capacity of carrying out Jaruzelski's policies. The attack upon the monastery is of particular importance since such an event had not occurred in the history of the people's republic since the 1950's, and because since the suspension of martial law, rumors have been rife that there are circles within the security services who would like to see the same sort of action repeated.

Informed observers see responsibility for the security forces, which popular opinion still holds responsible for the St. Martin action, in the hands of the former minister of the interior, Milewski, as well as the deputy interior minister, General Stachura. As a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, Milewski has a greater influence. Although he was regarded until a few months ago as one of the most important men in Poland's political leadership, diplomats have been saying in recent weeks that Milewski's star is

on the wane. Nonetheless, he could be joined by hardliners in the Politburo with a wide range of motives, such as Olszowski, whom the Poles regard as the chief opponent of the pope's visit, and Politburo member Albin Siwak. Former Central Committee secretary Grabski, owing to his good connections with Moscow and now commercial counselor to the embassy in East Berlin, may also be influential. In addition, the name of the present ambassador to East Berlin and former Warsaw district party leader, Kociolek, is frequently heard, a man with powerful connections and a frequent visitor in the Polish capital.

The economist Tadeusz Grabski gained considerable attention last October with his internal memorandum to the party in which he leveled strong criticism at, among other things, the proposed economic reforms, Jaruzelski's cherished creation. To the question, who, for example, might side with the hardliners on this critical issue in criticizing government policy, a very peculiar coalition comes to light, revealing the many sides from which the government might be vulnerable. Opposed to the economic reforms, along with the hardliners of the party, is, of course the economic apparatus which, like the planning staff within the government under Vice Premier Obodowski, fears for a loss of its power if the plants were to conduct their operations on their own responsibility. From another perspective, the skilled workers, most of them former Solidarity activists, perceive the weakness of present arrangements. The other workers primarily fear that economic reform will be accompanied by inflation and social uncertainty, and are fearful of a competitive system to which they are unaccustomed. The older managers in charge of enterprises are certainly no friends of innovations; their work would become more difficult, more exposed to risks, and these representatives of the "nomenklatura" system frequently lack real management capability. What remains in support of reform are a number of moderates in the party, pragmatists in the government and the apparatus as well as the technical intelligentsia in the factories.

It is here that a danger is growing for the government. Even now, the economic reforms have been so watered down that they have scarcely any real effect. Yet the more they are touted as successful, the easier it will be for the party hardliners to build a dangerously broad front along with economists of the type represented by Grabski. What could then evolve would be something new for Poland: unskilled workers and party conservatives would make common cause. It is then no wonder that these party leaders are now making themselves heard as having only the welfare of the ordinary "robotniks" at heart; that only they are concerned about the social equality and security of the toiling working class and, upon this, base their claim to be the rulers in Poland.

9878

CSO: 2300/254

THEORETICIAN SPEAKS ON PARTY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

PM230915 Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 30 Apr-1 May 83 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Prof Dr Adolf Dobieszewski, deputy director of PZPR Central Committee Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism, by GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA correspondent Janusz Brylinski--date, place not given]

[Text] [Question] You, Comrade, participate in many conferences taking place in different milieus. What are the most discussed problems?

[Answer] Most often, of course, those connected with the crisis. It would be hard to imagine this not being so. For the crisis is not an abstract concept: It is felt directly by people and it enmeshes everybody from cleaning woman to prime minister. After all, the most painful symptom of the crisis is the state of the market, and that hits the citizen directly, giving rise both to deeper reflection and to a normal human sense of exasperation. The consumer feels acutely the profound shortages on the market: shortages of food and of many different everyday articles. All this applies when we are talking about the so-called individual consumer. What about a minister or a director? Here the list of difficulties becomes longer and extends beyond store counters. There are shortages of raw materials, spare parts, semi-manufactured products, materials used in coproduction and essential for the production of the final coproduction article, and a hundred other vitally important and necessary goods. To put it in a nutshell, these matters dominate all discussions. People say: "Now we are having to pay the price of the economic policy favored in the past." But at the same time one hears an accompanying note which, cautiously, I would call optimistic. For, while getting on with this settlement of accounts, they also say that we are at the same time paying the price of converting our economy in order to function within the new social and economic mechanisms demanded by the reform. We are paying for something which ought to bear fruit in the future.

[Question] Are there any problems raised in the course of the debates that are specific to given milieus?

[Answer] There is a well-known saying which states that we are all traveling in the same cart. Consequently, it is not possible to avoid certain universal matters which affect us all. Unless someone is walking beside the cart. But neither is it possible to deny that there are sets of problems

raised in discussion which are specific to particular milieus. Farmers, for example, demand access to means of production above all else. We are in a paradoxical situation in which an ordinary plowshare has assumed the proportions of a major problem. For young people, in turn, getting an apartment is of paramount importance, as it is difficult to imagine embarking on professional or family life without a place of one's own. In other words, certain environmental variations do exist, although these are still determined by the notorious general difficulties. This may sound pessimistic, but we are not likely to change anything for the better if we sit back and fold our arms. The crisis will not be solved all by itself. To emerge from it, it is necessary to take action along two concurrent lines. The first offers the program for emerging from the crisis and the second--inseparably bound up with the first--concerns the sphere of general social activity. Such is the truth and nothing can be changed here. Any other suggestion represents utopian flights of fancy. Flights of fancy are fine--but only in books of fiction. In real life, I will admit, we do need imagination. But that imagination has to be of the kind that takes into account the realities of the country's situation and enhances its economic, moral, and cultural values. And this is precisely the way of thinking, the kind of intellectual and spiritual emotion that we expect from party members.

[Question] The program and the activity of the party must inspire and activate social effort. How can we translate this into the language of facts?

[Answer] The party came out with the initiative of a profound economic reform. On the one hand, this places hopes in the independence of enterprises and, on the other, it calls on the wisdom, initiative, and active involvement of all working people. Past experience has shown that it is not possible to direct the functioning of an organism as complicated as our economy via the instrument of injunction. We state quite openly that the abuse of this instrument made a major contribution to the making of the crisis. Today the major task faced by the party boils down to making the reform a fait accompli. There is no political task more important than that of reconstructing the economy and giving it enough thrust to encourage development. The symptoms of this revitalization are already visible, although we are all well aware that it is still insufficient to meet our needs and make full use of the latent potential existing in our economy. In any case--and this has always been and will always remain so--party policy is judged on the evidence of facts, of its calculable and tangible achievements. It is precisely these tangible facts which constitute politics in people's eyes; that is what politics is all about.

[Question] One meets with the opinion that much is being said about pulling out of the crisis, but much less is being done about it.

[Answer] In my opinion, in many cases these views are not without justification. Promises are being made too often and too recklessly that there is going to be a radical change for the better, whereas in reality no such progress is to be seen. Why? Because there are numerous psychological and other barriers which hamper any significant progress in overcoming the crisis.

[Question] What barriers are we talking about?

[Answer] The first is inherent in the management and direction system. It has become evident that it is very difficult to abolish the habits and bureaucratic customs of management cadres. In everyday practice they still too often continue to believe in the effective power of injunction and demand. This applies equally to central economic institutions and individual enterprises. Many directors and managers are still happiest when they receive the proverbial instructions and indicators. The ability to think in new terms does not come easily. The psychological barrier lurks there somewhere and paralyzes all action if there are no instructions, directives, or a telephone call from above....

[Question] And the role of the party in such situations?

[Answer] To put it briefly, to eliminate inertia in the sphere of thought and action. This is the most important task for party organizations. I am talking here about party organizations because there is a certain stereotyped way of thinking that has become prevalent, and this identifies the party with the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Voivodship Committee.... But the higher party bodies will not be able to change anything without assistance from their own base, comprising more than 2 million party members.

[Question] Comrade Professor, what is your appraisal of the level of activity of those 2 million party comrades?

[Answer] The situation is a complex one and it is difficult to give an unequivocal answer. The party must not be idealized. It is necessary that we be aware of both its strength and its weakness. The party as a whole has most definitely shaken off the effects of the shock caused by the events of the past. That is a fact. Many party organizations have taken up active work in their own milieus, and the will to act present in party organizations is evident from the way they are overcoming negative social, economic, and moral phenomena. Provided they have made some use of the experience to be gained from the past period, our comrades have now thought over many theoretical and practical problems involved in the work of the party and its task of playing a controlling and leading role in its environment and in the country. But let us not delude ourselves: At the same time we still have party organizations which continue to lead an anemic existence--indeed, often they just vegetate somewhere on life's fringes. It is up to higher party bodies to change this state of affairs.

[Question] The party has always--and that includes the past periods--declared the need for a social alliance for the sake of social and economic progress. Today, when we speak of winning allies, we stress that we are working under new circumstances.

[Answer] The question of class and political alliances is today a matter of fundamental importance for the party. Lenin often stressed that communists are only, as it were, a drop in the ocean and that it is not possible to think seriously about building socialism without entering into an alliance with those outside the party.

[Question] We used to say the same thing in the so-called past periods.

[Answer] And it was both right and proper to say it. It was, after all, thanks to the alliance between the communists, the populists, the democrats and non-party people that we carried out radical social and economic reforms in the initial period of People's Poland. It was also by drawing on those social forces that we put the industrialization program into practice. That is how it really was and no one can deny it.

[Question] But there have still been instances where those alliances were broken.

[Answer] Indeed there have. But that was the outcome of sectarian tendencies within the party, the result of departures from Leninist principles of class and political alliance. There is only one fundamental truth: If the party wants to lead society, it must draw support from forces within society, it must be able to express the interests of the individual classes, strata, and social groups: It has to be able to formulate its own allies' interests and aspirations. When we speak of the party's leading role, it is this very ability which constitutes a precondition for the success of the party program. And at the same time--and we must not forget this either--the party cannot passively accept everyone's interests. There are interests which are removed from reality; there are some which are too particular; and also some which threaten the vital interests of others. This can be seen especially clearly in situations brought about by the crisis, where everyone is trying, as it were, to pull the blanket over to his own side to cover himself up. Here the party cannot act as a passive spokesman for everyone but must oppose certain specific tendencies for the sake of either the common social interest or the long-term interest. This does not always win people over to the ranks of its sympathizers. And another thing. To fulfill its leading role in society, the party must itself be ideologically, politically, and organizationally unified.

[Question] The need for unity is also being mentioned on a wider, nationwide scale.

[Answer] The life of society progresses and develops through the process of bringing to light and resolving the causes of social discord. The party must be aware of this, as it is simply an objective, normal process. The thesis fostered during the 1970's proclaiming the nation's moral and political unity did not reflect the actual state of affairs. Polish society is widely differentiated in terms of class, social strata and groups, ideology, political orientation, and world view. Let us add, too, that we also encounter adversaries of socialism. The post-August period has brought the antisocialist forces into focus with great clarity. The whole tragedy lay in the fact that those forces claimed they had a multi-million-strong movement backing them up. To go back to the party, it must take all these facts and social phenomena into account in its practice. It is for those reasons that the question of getting society united for the sake of paramount national, state, moral, and intellectual values is so tremendously important. This can demonstrate the party's realism and credibility.

[Question] This means that the problem of the party's credibility and trustworthiness is becoming less acute?

[Answer] I did not say that. People's trust is never given once and for all. It has to be won in daily practice, won, as it were, over and over again. Every new sociopolitical situation gives rise to new problems which have to be solved in new ways, taking into consideration the whole complex character of the situation. You asked, for example, what guarantees there are that states of tension between the authorities in power and society will not recur. I will give you an answer: Such guarantees, such absolute guarantees do not exist. Everything depends on the configuration of social relations. If the authorities in power are under control, if they can adequately express social needs and aspirations, if they can daily relate their policy to public opinion, then states of tension or conflict will not arise. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that a policy which was adequate and relevant at one stage of development ceases to fulfill its function in a different period and under different circumstances. We find many examples in past history to illustrate this. There is, quite simply, no policy that can be given to us once and for all, or remain unfailingly correct at all times.

CSO: 2600/910

ROMANIA

SAMIZDAT DESCRIBES PERSECUTION OF HUNGARIAN INTELLECTUALS

Transylvania ELLENPONTOK in Hungarian 13 Jan 83 pp 1-5; 1-4

[Text] On 6 November the Romanian political police (State Security organs, Securitatea) searched Geza Szocs' apartment in Kolozsvar and kept him in custody for several hours. During the interrogation Szocs realized that the police were aware of all his movements over the last 3 weeks and that they found copies of the Transylvanian "samizdat" periodical ELLENPONTOK, which first appeared in December 1981, and that police had also photographic and tape-recorded documents. Thereupon Szocs, following a previously agreed strategy of diversion, "broke down" and "confessed" that the copies of ELLENPONTOK, which were purportedly disseminated by him, originated in Hungary. His allegation was eventually criticized by certain Transylvanian Hungarians, who claimed that it might be used to further exacerbate relations between the two countries. Such opinions overlook the fact that Szocs' references involved those Hungarian associations whose existence is barely tolerated by the Hungarian government.

After his confession Szocs was released on the same day in the evening and was notified that his hearing would be continued on 8 November. As soon as he was freed Szocs escaped from Kolozsvar, and on that very same day, 6 November, he wrote a letter to the authorities retracting his confession noting that it was obtained under duress and threats. Partly on foot and partly hitchhiking he reached the neurological clinic of Tolgyes, 25 kilometers from the spa at Borszek, where he gained admission claiming that he was suffering from severe persecution mania. In order to make outside contacts he left the clinic often. It thus happened that during a routine police checkup he jumped from the train and suffered a ruptured tendon and severe bruises on one of his legs.

On 9 December Szocs talked by phone with Attila Ara-Kovacs and told him that he intended to remain in hiding as long as the state security organs refused him safety and freedom. Following this telephone conversation he was arrested at the post office of Marosheviz. He was interrogated for 4 days, first at Marosheviz and later on 12 December in Kilozsvar. He revealed his identity only when confronted by his family physician.

Several facts tend to prove that he was severely abused, i.e., his head was knocked against the wall, because he refused to repudiate the Memorandum and the Program Statement published in the 8th issue of ELLENPONTOK, and did not want to admit the guilt of Andras Suto. His interrogators tried to coax him

into confessing that Suto was involved in the drafting of the 8th issue of the samizdat paper. After 4 days of detention Szocs was released and took up residence with his parents in Kolozsvár. The conditions of his release are unknown. The home of his parents since then has been under conspicuous police surveillance, his visitors are registered and in some cases followed but are not harassed. On 28 December Szocs was admitted to a hospital in a state of serious debility, lung embolism and probable pneumonia and pleurisy. He is presently still under their care.

On 7 November, police raided the homes of various persons in Nagyvárad, among them those of Attila Ara-Kovacs and Karoly Toth. The agents maintained constant radio contact between the sites of the house searches in order to inform each other about the findings. In Karoly Toth's home they did not find any compromising material. They nevertheless seized books concerning Hungarian history, documentary materials of the Endre Ady Literary Circle and even confiscated his typewriter. The house search lasted until late afternoon and in further course Karoly Toth, his wife and his minor sister-in-law were transported to the headquarters of state security. His sister-in-law was released after 4 hours, his wife about midnight, but was summoned to return next day for a few hours. Karoly Toth's interrogation lasted, with two interruptions, until 11 November. He was inhumanely humiliated, beaten and tortured; in chains he was kicked, his head knocked against the wall and his hair pulled. With hands his head, neck and kidneys were clubbed with a rubber truncheon. Evidence of the beating was still visible 2 weeks later. He was also threatened with skopolamin injections, since he had previously agreed with Attila Ara-Kovacs and Geza Szocs that under duress they would admit to the authorship of ELLENPONTOK and to the drafting of the Memorandum and Program proposal, which were sent to the CSCE Conference in Madrid. Moreover, in view of the self-assuredness of his interrogators he thought that they knew more than what they said, he admitted to the charges leveled against him. He probably revealed this first to Attila Ara-Kovacs, who also confessed. After his confession Karoly Toth was released. Since 12 November he has been able to work again but his home is under surveillance and he has been visited several times by a state security officer for a "small conversation."

Nor did police find any compromising material when they searched Attila Ara-Kovacs' home. Yet several magazines and rare books were confiscated, the 2,727 forints that his wife had received for relocation expenses was taken and her typewriter seized. Following the house-search Ara-Kovacs was also arrested and questioned for 48 hours. During his interrogation he had to listen to Karoly Nemeth's cries for help, who was being beaten in the adjoining room. Between two hearings, for the sake of appearance, he was allowed to go home for a few hours. When like Karoly Toth, Ara Kovacs also confessed, he was released under the condition that he would not leave Nagyvárad. Since then his home has been watched. Time and again he has been conspicuously followed on the street, and his telephone conversations are jammed. On 3 December his home was again searched without a legal warrant and despite the protests of his mother who lived there. This time the agents seized 20 forints. His father had already suffered a serious shock at the time of the first house-search and spent more than a month in a hospital.

During the interrogations police officers tried to obtain proof that ELLENPONTOK was published with the explicit support of the Hungarian authorities and that the editors had received the source materials from the Hungarian consul in Kolozsvár, Rudaş, by diplomatic pouch. Ara-Kovács was also accused of having received money (the 2,727 forints seized in his home) and a visa for Hungary from the Hungarian authorities for having edited ELLENPONTOK. The questioning in all three cases focused on efforts to find proof of as many compromising links with Hungary as possible.

To sum it up, Attila Ara-Kovács, Géza Szócs, and Károly Tóth admitted that they had edited the samizdat periodical ELLENPONTOK, written many of its articles and entirely composed the 8th issue. They however claimed that they were not aware of any other editors. After their release all three withdrew their confessions, noting that they were made under duress.

Besides the three aforementioned persons there were many more who were harassed. Most of the people, those with whom Szócs had met frequently during the 3 weeks prior to his arrest were questioned and their homes searched. Thus police raids were made on the homes of the following persons: Reverend László Tókes reformed pastor at Dés, writer Attila Vári, veterinarian Attila Keleman, historian Mihály Spielmann and stage manager Gábor Tompa at Marosvásárhely, teacher Borbála Lukács at Csíkszentmihály, poet László Bogdan, stage director András Balogh, poet Zoltán Czégó and dentist Imre Markó at Sepsiszentgyörgy, stage director Gábor Tompa and sculptor Vid Törnyai in Kolozsvár, economist Lóránt Kertész, engineer Gábor Varga and student Márta Józsa in Nagyvárad (Márta Józsa was the third person, aside from Károly Tóth and Géza Szócs, who was beaten during interrogation). On 23 November high school teacher Erő Borbély and architect Katalin Bíró were arrested after their home was searched. No one has seen them since and their whereabouts are unknown. During the house raids police seized books printed in Hungary (primarily historical, ethnographic and cultural history works), old Hungarian publications (for example books and magazines published in Transylvania between the two world wars), private correspondence, typewriters, and food imported from Hungary. The number of those who were interrogated was much greater. The authorities obviously tried to find evidence of contacts with people in Hungary. Police also sought to wrest compromising confessions from the detained to indict well-known Romanian Hungarian intellectuals.

A final analysis of the interrogations shows that the authorities possessed very little and inaccurate information despite their considerable technical apparatus that they used to watch first of all Szócs and his acquaintances.

With respect to the impact of these events in Transylvania an apparent duality prevails in public opinion. On the one hand it is a fact that since November 1982 people have been more intimidated by the authorities, they are more afraid of each other, and have less courage to resist oppression than ever before. On the other hand knowledge about the periodical ELLENPONTOK has spread rapidly all over Transylvania (primarily among Transylvanian Hungarians) and for most people has brought a ray of hope in this hopeless situation. When people learned about the house searches and arrests, many secretly offered

financial help to those who were harassed, and expressed their solidarity in various ways. The victims received food donations from friends as well as from strangers, which meant under Romanian circumstances that the donors surrendered their daily food ration.

This summary of events was prepared in Transylvania and was closed on 13 January 1983.

The authors wish to express their gratitude to all those who in any form voiced their solidarity with those who were persecuted, or have tried to help them in any way.

BIOGRAPHIES

KAROLY TOTH

He was born in Szatmar (Satu Mare) in 1942. His father is retired civil servant, his mother housewife. They still live in Szatmar. Karoly attended school in that city and graduated from high school in 1960. From 1960 to 1965 he studied biology-geography at the Babes-Bolyai University and received a teaching diploma in 1965. He wanted to stay at the university and was given a promise to that effect. However, after graduation he was placed in a Nagyvarad school and since then has been teaching natural history there. Currently he teaches at the elementary school No 1 (the so-called gypsy school) which is his third post. His professional rating has been "very good" every year.

Toth was married in 1965 and in 1967 the couple had a son named Csaba. He was divorced in 1978 and the same year married Ilona Toth (born in 1958 in Nagyvarad), who is currently a housewife and a member of leadership of the Endre Ady Literacy Circle. They live in Nagyvarad on Tudor Vladimirescu Street No 26 in the humid basement of a house owned by the Evangelical Church.

Karoly Toth has been a member of the Endre Ady Literary Circle leadership since 1973. Between 1975 and 1977 he was director of this circle. The director's position was abolished in 1979 because the circle's leader was always a target of harassment by the authorities. Since then a six member executive committee directs its work. As the director of the circle and as well as a private person, Toth relentlessly fought against the violations of national minority rights as well as of those of the citizen rights in general.

In 1974 he submitted a petition to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in which he objected to the fact that in Romania certain publications from Hungary could not be subscribed to at all and others by only a limited few. As a result of his protest he was allowed to subscribe to one of the listed Hungarian newspapers. In 1975 the state security organs tried to prove--on the basis of false testimonies--that members of the Endre Ady Literary Circle had made offensive statements against the Romanian state in private conversations. In the fall of 1978 Toth protested in vain, in letters sent to the Ministry of Education and the Central Committee of the RCP, against

the retroactive and humiliating application of a decree which was prejudicial to the teachers' interests. In May 1979 he and his wife took part in the drafting of a petition for the licensing in western Romania of 61 Hungarian language cultural intellectual periodicals, but without success. In January 1982 he protested, together with 13 Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals of Nagyvarad to the Socialist Cultural and Educational Council in Bucharest against the project of building a settlement on the grounds of the Nagyvarad citadel, which is registered by the UNESCO as a historic monument.

At numerous round-table conferences meetings of the Endre Ady Literary Circle and on other occasions Toth pointed out the discrimination by the authorities against ethnic nationalities living in Romania, the measures taken toward forced assimilation and government policies bent upon eliminating national identities.

Until 1973, before the size of the Hungarian-language daily of Bihar county was drastically reduced, Toth's popular scientific articles, book- and magazine-reviews, and translations appeared in it regularly. His articles on similar topics were also published in IFJU MUNKAS (Young Worker), KORUNK (Our Era), and a longtime contributor to the Periodica column A HET (The Week). His writings on pedagogical topics appeared in FAKLYA (Torch), and in its special editions, in BIHARI NAPLO (Diary of Bihar), in IFJU MUNKAS and TANUGYI UJSAG (Pedagogical Review). He participated in various literary discussions in the literary periodical UTUNK (Our Road) and published essays on Endre Ady in IFJUMUNKAS and on Attila Jozsef in a trilingual University periodical of Kolozsvar called ECHINOX.

ATTILA T. KOVACS

Attila T. Kovacs (with the pen-name of Ara-Kovacs) was born in 1953 in Nagyvarad (Oradea). His father is retired civil servant and his mother is housewife. He lives with his parents in Nagyvarad, their address is Nufarului Street 46, 3d floor, No 12. He graduated from high school in Nagyvarad in 1972. After graduation he worked for a short time in the local brewery. In 1973 he became a student at the philosophical faculty of the University Babes-Bolyai, and attained his philosophy teacher's diploma in 1978.

In 1979 he was married. His wife lives in Hungary. With the intention of resettling to Hungary, he relinquished his Romanian citizenship. Since then he has been supported by his parents and his student wife in Hungary. Since he stated his intention to leave Romania, and without citizenship, he cannot obtain any employment.

Ara-Kovacs has been a member of the Endre Ady Literary Circle since he was a high school student. In 1978, he was detained by the Nagyvarad security police and was threatened with arrest if he refused to make damning revelations about some prominent Romanian Hungarian intellectuals (for example Edgar Balogh, Zoltan Kallos, Erno Gall, Andras Suto, and Sandor Toth). His interrogators called these personalities "national chauvinist criminals" and called the circle and some periodicals, like A HET and KORUNK, "chauvinist nests." Upon his release he left home and for months went into hiding in Kolozsvar. Police

stopped harassing him only as a result of the protests from prominent Romanian-Hungarian intellectuals. In 1980 Ara-Kovacs was briefly detained at the passport section of the Nagyvarad police. Police agents tried with threats of imprisonment to force him to make the damaging statements that the aforementioned persons referred to earlier, but he again refused to comply.

Ara-Kovacs has been publishing more or less regularly since 1970. Most of his writing appeared in ECHINOX (on new Platonism, Dostoyevsky, some existentialist problems, etc.) His writing has also appeared in the UJ SYMPOSION (New Symposium) on Ady, the new Hungarian novel, and some ethical questions; further in KORUNK about anticulture, subculture, and the New Left; and also in NAPJAINK (Our Days), IGAZSAG (Justice), IFJUMUNKAS, UTUNK, etc. In 1978 he translated a volume-size text by Heidegger that the Kriterion publishers did not print. In 1980 he wrote a book-long essay entitled ON THE LOGIC OF EXISTENCE on philosophical questions. Currently he is working on an ONTOLOGY.

GEZA SZOCS

As Geza Szocs is a well-known poet we are noting only the most relevant data of his life.

He was born in 1954 at Marosvasarhely (Tirgu-Mures). His father is Istvan Szocs, a Transylvanian writer, his mother is teacher. He went to school first in Marosvasarhely and later in Kolozsvar, where he graduated from high school in 1972. Beginning in 1972 he was a student of the Hungarian-Russian department of the Babes-Bolyai University, and in 1978 graduated with Hungarian-Russian teacher diploma.

He was married in 1978 (his wife's name is Marta Dancsuj). They had a daughter named Petra in 1979. In the summer of 1982 he separated from his wife in order to relieve his family from police persecution. His present address is Mica Street 5, apt 14.

From 1978 Szocs has written a popular column called "Fellegvar" (Citadel) in the Hungarian-language daily IGAZSAG of Kolozsvar (Kolozs county). In 1979 the Herder prize of the F.V.S. [Baron von Stein Foundation] of Hamburg was granted to Andras Suto who thus became entitled to recommend somebody for a 1 year Austrian stipend. Suto proposed Szocs who thence studied between 1979 and 1980 at the University of Vienna, and gave readings of his poems at literary meetings in various West European cities. He returned to Transylvania in the fall of 1980, but complying with an invitation went again to Western Europe in July 1981, and stayed there until the end of the year. As a result of pressure by the Romanian authorities he was fired from his editorship post in the spring of 1982. Thereupon he lived for a while on income from odd jobs. In the fall of 1982 he got a teaching position in a school in Kolozsvar.

His first volume of poems was published in 1975 by Kriterion under the title "Ta mentel at a vizen" (You Crossed the Water), that formed part of a series called FORRAS (Source) of first publications by young authors. As a result of the book he was accepted as a member of the Romanian Writers Association. His second volume entitled "A kilatotorony es kornyek" (The Watchtower and Its

Environment) appeared in 1977 and his third anthology of poems "Parbaj vagy a huszonharmadik hóhullás" (Duel or the 23d Snowfall) was published in 1979. Censorship deleted some of his poems from the ready for printing manuscript. His poems were also published by numerous periodicals in Romania and abroad. They are regularly read by Budapest and Kolozsvár radios. Translations of his verses have appeared in Romanian and foreign literary magazines.

12312

CSO: 8125/1093

PROSPECTS FOR 'DIFFERENTIATION' WITHIN LCY EXAMINED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 370, 26 Mar 83 pp 7, 9

[Article by Branko Vlahovic: "Who Has No Place in the LCY"]

[Text] Before, during and after last year's congresses we many times heard assessments from highest party officials, but also from "ordinary" members, that the LC must free itself of those who are destroying its reputation by their behavior. And in the last two series of holiday interviews our highest leaders once again announced tighter accountability and differentiation in the ranks of the LC. Since those words have been used very often in the last 2 years, questions and answers on this topic would be nothing new in the daily press if quite a few articles had not been published on the removal and punishment of opstina officials and [enterprise] directors. Finally certain disreputable occurrences have even begun to be analyzed in open meetings--and the public is being informed of this--which up to now were spoken about only in closed gatherings or, if they were mentioned in public, the terms were vague.

The Bylaws Commission of the League of Communists of Croatia recently debated political-ideological accountability of party members who had committed crimes and other unlawful acts. There are increasingly frequent examples of steps being taken toward individual and collective responsibility in the League of Communists, just as there have been basic organizations of the LC dissolved and secretariats of basic organizations of the LC [OOSK] replaced because of insufficient activity and a lack of responsibility toward tasks, etc. There have also been secretaries of OOSK and members of opstina committees and their presidiums recalled and dismissed. But cases are still rare in which members of leadership bodies, from the highest to the lowest levels, submit resignations because of inactivity and failure to discharge the obligations arising out of the position they hold in the LC.

Do these dismissals and expulsions from the LC herald a broader differentiation in the party? Can it be carried through to the end under today's conditions, when it is well known that opportunism has "drugged" a sizable portion of the membership? What are the principal obstacles to differentiation? Would the LC lose strength or become still more robust if several hundred thousand inactive members had to leave its ranks? We will attempt to answer those questions in this article.

Party statisticians informed the public in the early days of this year that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has more than 2.16 million members. More precisely, at the beginning of July 1982 the party had 2,154,448 members. But the statistics cannot answer the extremely important question of how many of those are really active and how many are what we call ballast and those whom the party would gladly do without.

The difficult economic situation and the problems that have accumulated in society have imposed a debate about the moral image of the member of the LC, but also the task of separating the "grain from the corn cockle," or, as it is put in official party jargon, differentiation. When the postwar history of the party is analyzed, one easily notes that discussions of the moral image have precisely begun at times of serious difficulties in our society. Even members of the LC have not remained immune to the adverse things in society. Indeed there have been quite a few members of the party among those who have broken the law and violated regulations, and they have therefore been made accountable before the courts.

Although there are no precise figures on how many members of the LC are among those who have committed crimes, economic offenses, serious misdemeanors and breaches of work duties, it is reliably known that the number is not negligible. It is estimated, for example, that members of the LC were a majority in committing about 5,000 economic offenses in SR Croatia in 1981: [enterprise] directors, commercial directors, chief bookkeepers, warehouse managers, sales clerks, cashiers, etc. All of this confirms that there are truly good reasons for debating the moral image and differentiation in the LC. And something else. The removal of opstina officials and [enterprise] directors (which in recent days we have been reading about often in daily newspapers--are evidence that the supervisory and the worker are equally responsible for poor work and abuses. This refutes assertions which we have been hearing for years about how we mainly punish those who have committed minor crimes, i.e., that only the "small fry" suffer.

Removal from office and punishment of opstina leaders and [enterprise] directors cannot diminish the prestige of the party. Indeed, this can only strengthen confidence in the League of Communists. The publication of all these scandals and incidents has helped to open up the discussion in all places and at all levels. Questions are being put in public which until recently were spoken out only in corridors. There is an ever greater demand, for example, for it to be stated in public who are the persons responsible for the major failures of the economy.

Party punishment and removal from office in several opstinas in Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina show that the differentiation has begun. Those who anticipated large-scale expulsions have probably been disappointed and will not agree with our assessment. We are convinced that any sort of short-term campaign would be more harmful than useful and that the differentiation must be long-term and must be carried out in all places.

What have been the experiences so far in ridding the party of ballast?

When the party decided to bolster its ranks on a larger scale, some people slipped into it for "business" reasons, i.e., in pursuit of their own ends. Along with those who have diverged from party policy at the historical "bends in the road," these members have become those who have been putting on the brakes.

The first postwar ideological differentiation occurred after the conflict with the Cominform. We have not read the official figures on how many members of the LC were expelled at that time in party statistics, but we found them in a piece of scholarship. From 1948 to September 1952 59,596 were expelled from the party, and 31,142 members were punished with other penalties.

The more the prewar and wartime period were forgotten, the more obvious the moral erosion became. Tito spoke about this on 15 March 1952 to a delegation of the 1st Congress of the League of Yugoslav Students: "The image of the communist has become pale. It has changed as a consequence of certain alien conceptions which have entered the party. Today the party member is not regarded as a fighter who has to carry a greater load, to be an example to others.... We will not complain if there are 100,000 fewer members if it is more robust, if it is a collective that will build the image of the new man, if members of the party are an example for others."

Over the last 20 years or so the exit door of the party was opened widest in 1972. In that year the LCY "lost" 50,284 members, 11,893 in Croatia alone. Let us recall: those were the years when nationalism, liberalism and other "isms" were raging. The consolidation and clarification of the political situation in society and in the ranks of the party led to expulsion, removal from the rolls of the LC, as well as voluntary withdrawal from the ranks of the party.

Even though the LC has on several occasions freed itself of members who in their behavior were operating objectively contrary to the policy of the LC, the party has been unable to rid itself of that ballast permanently, or at least for a lengthy period of time. What are the reasons for that? The LC has not managed to altogether heal its wounds, since some of the people who were operating against the policy of the LC declared a truce, were not troublesome, did not declare themselves in public, and thus remained on the party lists. Another reason is that because of opportunism and calculation, the ideological "deep plowing" did not make headway in many places. Only the most outspoken were punished and those who punished themselves. Often people waited for someone from the higher leadership to "bring down the knife" and settle the situation with the force of authority.

But opportunism was not solely at fault for the fact that all the roots of negativism were not pulled out in good time. That is, in many basic organizations of the LC the members were not and still are not ideologically competent enough to recognize and diagnose the negative occurrences and those responsible precisely and in good time.

In a stable economic situation--which acted like a sedative and affected all spheres of the life of society--that segment of the membership vegetated in

the party population. Only when the socioeconomic relations began to become complicated did that segment of the membership begin to lose the basic course, and the old diseases became ever more aggressive. The disguised or muffled "isms" began to develop and swell in keeping with the growing nervousness in society.

They were joined by that portion of newly enrolled members who had entered the party out of careerism and personal calculations, feeling no moral obligation whatsoever to make even a minimal contribution to the work of the LC. Indeed they attempted to justify their behavior by haughtily ignoring the "unproductive" party action. Their conventional sentence was: "Who is one supposed to work with here?" and they fled from any sort of concrete party commitment like the devil from incense.

When regeneration of those responsible for negative occurrences in the LC is spoken about and analyzed, one is apt to hear the argument that for every member expelled the LC has enrolled and is enrolling three new ones, and that it is precisely that numerical strengthening that has weakened the party. How accurate is that assertion?

The argument that the increased enrollment is principally at fault for the entry into the LC of those who do not deserve it is one-sided and essentially mistaken. We feel that it is a good thing for the party to be open, to young people especially. What is the problem? The discussion should not be whether, but how to enroll new members. Unfortunately the criteria for passing out party cards are looser and looser. In many places the criterion for enrollment in the LC has for a long time now been who wants to join the LC rather than who deserves to be a party member. Unless an analysis is made as to whether we are dealing with someone who deserves to be in the LC because of his effort, but rather we must enroll him because others also accept him, then it must be anticipated that the selection will be motley.

When has the enrollment been largest in the League of Communists? In 1948, 1968 and 1980. In the second half of 1948 alone 80,000 members were enrolled, and from then until 1952 the membership increased about 63 percent. We recall that in 1948 (5th Congress of the CPY) the CPY had 468,275 members and 51,612 candidates for membership. As is well known, that was the year of the conflict with the Cominform. Record enrollment in the Croatian LC was in 1968: at that time 27,761 members were enrolled. At the time of Tito's illness and after his death a large number of young people were enrolled in the party. The desire and willingness of young men and women to continue on Tito's road and to prove their commitment was expressed in the increased interest in entering the League of Communists. In 1980 199,446 members were enrolled in Yugoslavia as a whole and 23,892 in SR Croatia.

When today we analyze that enrollment, it is obvious that there were many features of a short-term campaign. Numbers became more important than qualitative criteria. Since these were mainly young people, one can understand that their desire to enroll was the most important reason for their enrollment--these were after all people with little experience of life--but the error was committed later. No effort was made to raise the level of ideology and theory

of these newly enrolled members. Later the enthusiasm passed, and little attention was paid to this segment of the membership, and it is understandable that an appreciable attrition occurred. It is interesting that university students were especially numerous among those dropped from the rolls because of failure to attend meetings of the LC.

Middle-aged or elderly readers probably remember well the slogans launched by the nationalities: "Everyone join the party!" They wanted by massive enrollment in the League of Communists to take command of the party by outvoting and other "democratic" methods and to take posts in the leadership. Although there were even tragicomic cases of nationalists being pushed into various forums, that conception of theirs was nevertheless not realized. Indeed the statistics show that their campaign of making a lot of noise was unsuccessful. In SR Croatia the lowest enrollment in 20 years was precisely in 1970: 5,500, the same as in 1962.

The statistics also show that in certain periods it was very easy to enter the party, but also to leave it. Analyses of the growth of the membership of the Croatian LC and LCY over the last two decades show a very high fluctuation. Between 1961 and 1981 there were 520,160 members who had red cards in SR Croatia. The size of the fluctuation is indicated by the fact that in 1962 [original reads "1982"] the Croatian LC had about 350,000 members. Which means that over two decades 299,599 were enrolled, but at the same time 108,314 members left the party because of expulsion, removal from the rolls and resignation. Over that same period the LCY enrolled 3,146,734 members. The extent to which the membership of the LCY has begun to fall off is shown by the figure that last July the LCY had 2.16 million members.

The ever greater fluctuation of the membership is related to the fact that our party is getting younger and younger. The average age of the members has dropped appreciably over the last 15 years or so, especially with the new members enrolled 3 years ago. Yet one must conclude that work with the new members of the LC has been more and more slack even though there are many political schools. How otherwise to explain the discrepancy between the imposing numbers and the ever greater sluggishness of members of the LC? We view the fluctuation of the membership as an extremely important question that deserves particular analysis. Some people say that it is an indicator of growth, and others that it is evidence of declining prestige of the LC.

The time in which we live has shown that the battle is not won by numbers, but by quality. One hears ever more frequently the demand that we relieve the OOSK of competition and the strange complex to the effect that the basic organization which has not enrolled at least one member during the year is not performing well. The enrollment Olympics makes it easier for those following their own calculations and careers to enter the LC.

Places are not rare where up to now "moral-political suitability" has been equated with membership in the LC, so that some people have become "communists" so as to get a job and achieve their ambitions more easily. It is truly difficult to explain examples such as we have heard in Zagreb these past several days. Two 50-year-olds, teachers in a junior postsecondary college,

were recommended for enrollment in the LC. There is good reason to ask how it is that they are to become members of the LC only at such an age, can it be that they have not had an occasion up to now, can it be that they were not previously able to prove themselves? If the performance of every member of the LC is evaluated in practice the way it has been conceived, the category "moral and political suitability," the way it is now assessed, would no longer be necessary.

Is it possible for differentiation in the LC to be carried out when opportunism has lulled a considerable portion of the membership to sleep and criticism and self-criticism have in many organizations long ago become, as one high party official put it, a "rusty gun"? The highest party leaders judge that criticism today stands on shaky legs, has become stunted, is undeveloped. Oversensitivity to criticism has developed instead.

It would be pure Utopianism to anticipate that the passive portion of the membership would on its own become self-conscious and wake up without urging from outside. But differentiation in the LC is not a matter of anyone's good will: it is imposed by the times. Indeed if anyone wanted to halt this process, he would not succeed. The difficult and ever more serious situation in society is tending to antagonize relations in all structures, including the LC. The more pressure the difficulties put on the working people and citizens, the more demands there will be for more responsible behavior.

A differentiation can be carried out only over a lengthy period of time. It would be overoptimistic to expect that the party sediment which has gathered over the years can be cleaned up in a short period of time. All campaigns are short-lived, and the effects are usually small. Nor should there be any dilemma over whether the hotbeds of negative occurrences should be eliminated. Individuals and groups who are spreading the contagion of various "isms" must be removed from the ranks of the party.

The party differentiation should be conducted in two ways. The first line of demarcation must be between work and idleness. That ought to be the easier part of the job. Anyone who has failed to perform his work obligation lacks respect in his own place, and must not remain in the LC.

The second line of demarcation is ideological. Certainly this is the more difficult part of the job, since it necessitates rapid reaction and precise diagnoses. It has been more difficult to deal with members who advocated unacceptable ideological views, and that because the ideological "system of red lights" were not working for many people. It was easier for us to decide to expel a worker from the LC, even for trivial reasons, than office workers or [enterprise] directors for major errors. Recently, to be sure, they have been making a greater effort to remain in the LC, not because they like it more, but because the red card has been one of the elements on which they have built their professional career and social security.

Would the LC lose strength if it renounced several hundred thousand members? We feel that it would not. Certainly we are not thinking of any blunt incision, but of a differentiation on the basis of an analysis of the work and

performance of every individual. By following the formula "three unjustified absences--turn in your card" we would easily clean out the LC. But we feel that this is not the right way. First, the party must answer the question of why a large segment is passive and what it has done to motivate that large number to perform. That is, before anyone is given a final grade as to whether he has been performing or not performing, he should be given a task. Only then will it be possible to tell the nonperformers to return their party cards. As for those others who are operating in opposition to the policy of the LC, there should be no hesitation. There is no place for them in the League of Communists.

We are convinced that Tito's words expressed to the delegation of the 1st Congress of the League of Yugoslav University Students, which we quoted in the first part of the article, is more relevant today than ever. By proving that it is willing to undertake an ideological showdown with those responsible for negative things in its own ranks, the League of Communists will show that it has the strength to restore the old prestige of the communist, an industrious and honorable man who is truly a model and an example for others.

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